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ESSAY
SECTION 2 ENFORCEMENT AND THE
GREAT RECESSION: WHY LESS
(ENFORCEMENT) MIGHT MEAN MORE (GDP)
Alan J. Meese*
The Great Recession has provoked calls for more vigorous regulation in
all sectors, including antitrust enforcement. After President Obama took
office, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice abandoned the
Bush Administration’s standard of liability under section 2 of the Sherman
Act, which forbids unlawful monopolization, as insufficiently
interventionist.
Based on the premise that similarly lax antitrust
enforcement caused and deepened the Great Depression, the Obama
Administration outlined a more intrusive and consumer-focused approach
to section 2 enforcement as part of a larger national strategy to combat the
“extreme” economic crisis the nation was then facing.
This Essay draws on macroeconomic theory and the New Deal
experience to examine the relationship between section 2 standards and
macroeconomic stability. In particular, this Essay evaluates the claim that
more aggressive section 2 enforcement focused on maximizing the welfare
of consumers who purchase from monopolists would help forestall and
ameliorate economic downturns. While empirical evidence confirms the
Obama Administration’s claims that New Deal efforts to cartelize prices
and wages exacerbated the Depression, this Essay argues that substitution
of this novel and more intrusive “consumer welfare effects” test for the
Bush Administration’s “disproportionality” standard would not stimulate
aggregate demand, and may even reduce national output at the margins.
Given the ambiguity in the aggregate impact of such enforcement, this
Essay concludes that antitrust regulation should abandon any pretensions
of being a tool for macroeconomic stabilization, and focus solely on
identifying and condemning conduct that on balance results in a
misallocation of resources and a reduction in total economic surplus. By
keeping its microeconomic focus, antitrust regulation can help maximize
the potential value of the gross domestic product, while monetary and fiscal
policy produce sufficient aggregate demand to ensure full employment of
society’s resources and to achieve that potential value.
* Ball Professor of Law and Cabell Research Professor of Law, William and Mary Law
School.
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INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession has led to reconsideration of the appropriate scope
of federal regulation, and antitrust regulation is no exception. Upon taking
office, President Obama’s chief antitrust official opined that the Bush
Administration’s lax enforcement of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 1 which
bans unlawful monopolization, had helped cause and exacerbate the most
Reasoning that New Deal-imposed
recent economic downturn.2
cartelization had deepened and lengthened the Great Depression, the Obama
Administration argued that the previous administration should have
attacked more monopolies under section 2 to encourage competition and
reduce prices in monopolized markets. 3 The new administration repudiated
the Bush Administration’s lengthy report on section 2 enforcement policy,
which concluded that section 2 bans monopolistic conduct that imposes
harm on consumers in the relevant market that is disproportionate to any
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”).
2. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div.,
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era 4–9 (May 11, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245711.pdf; infra notes 51–57 and accompanying
text.
3. See Varney, supra note 2, at 2–9; infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text.
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efficiencies it creates. 4 Ironically, this approach already was a more
interventionist standard than that contained in decades of section 2 case law,
whereby courts provided a safe harbor for efficient conduct by monopolists,
regardless of the impact of such conduct on prices in the relevant market
and without comparing the benefits of such efficiencies to consumer harm. 5
Although the Obama Administration did not articulate a precise standard it
would employ under section 2, it contended that section 2 enforcement
should focus more on the welfare of consumers in monopolized markets,
rather than efficiencies that benefit producers.6 This implied that the
Antitrust Division would apply the so-called “consumer welfare effects”
standard, which several academics and a progressive antitrust think tank
had advocated, 7 but which the U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly rejected
on several occasions. 8 The new administration claimed that this more
aggressive standard would have prevented the Great Recession, or at least
mitigated its severity. 9
While the withdrawal was no surprise, given candidate Obama’s 2007
statements criticizing President Bush’s antitrust enforcement record,10 the
rationale was both novel and surprising. By comparing Bush’s less
intrusive “disproportionality” standard to the New Deal cartelization
policies that deepened and lengthened the Depression, Obama’s antitrust
chief suggested that section 2 enforcement can serve as a tool for
macroeconomic stabilization, a task usually reserved for fiscal and
monetary policy. This Essay evaluates the claim that more aggressive
section 2 enforcement implementing a consumer welfare effects test would
in fact forestall and ameliorate economic downturns.
While empirical evidence confirms that the National Industrial Recovery
Act of 1933 11 (NIRA) and subsequent New Deal efforts to cartelize prices
and wages deepened and lengthened the Depression, 12 the New Deal
experience with coercive cartelization and relaxed antitrust enforcement
does not support the Obama Administration’s call for more aggressive
section 2 enforcement. Simply put, any analogy between the massive
cartelization of the 1930s and the Bush Administration’s antitrust
enforcement policy is strained at best. Even its critics concede that the
Bush Administration aggressively pursued horizontal price fixing under

4.
5.
6.
7.

See Varney, supra note 2, at 8–9; infra notes 32–38 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 58–74 and accompanying text.
See Varney, supra note 2, at 9–14; infra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S
TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 67 (Albert Foer ed., 2008) [hereinafter AAI
TRANSITION REPORT]; infra notes 23–29, 76–80 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 58–74 and accompanying text.
9. See Varney, supra note 2, at 5.
10. See generally Barack Obama, Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American
Antitrust Institute, AM. ANTITRUST INST. (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/
files/aai-%20Presidential%20campaign%20-%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf.
11. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (previously codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 701–712 (Supp. 1933)),
invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
12. See infra notes 190–203 and accompanying text.
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section 1 of the Sherman Act. 13 Thus, any argument that more aggressive
enforcement would have helped prevent and mitigate the recent downturn
must focus solely on the enforcement of section 2, and evaluate the impact
of more aggressive enforcement on aggregate demand, aggregate supply,
and thus national gross domestic product (GDP).
This Essay argues that substitution of a novel and more intrusive
consumer welfare effects test for the Bush Administration’s
disproportionality standard would not stimulate aggregate demand and may
even reduce national output at the margins. For one thing, the economic
impact of section 2 enforcement is likely quite modest. The government
has brought few such cases in the last two decades, cases that collectively
had only a miniscule impact on the overall economy. 14 More tellingly, in
the more than two years since the Obama Antitrust Division announced a
more aggressive enforcement posture, it has brought only one section 2
case—against a hospital earning less than $300 million per year in revenues
and serving a town with just over 100,000 residents. 15 At the same time,
the Obama Administration has sought to boost the prerogatives of labor
unions, thereby encouraging the cartelization of labor, reducing the
flexibility of wages, and counteracting the supposed effect of antimonopoly enforcement.
In any event, it is by no means clear that the impact of more aggressive
enforcement, modest though it may be, would be positive. All section 2
standards will ban some conduct that raises the prices consumers pay in the
relevant market. Because the Bush Administration’s disproportionality test
was already more aggressive than the standard articulated by the Supreme
Court, any evaluation of the macroeconomic impact of an even more
aggressive enforcement posture implementing the novel consumer welfare
effects test must focus on that category of previously lawful conduct that
this more intrusive standard would condemn. This kind of conduct bears
only passing resemblance to the naked cartel price fixing that New Deal
legislation imposed. Such conduct would have survived scrutiny under the
less intrusive disproportionality standard only because it produces
significant efficiencies.16 The positive welfare effects of this conduct’s
efficiencies will almost always outweigh—sometimes by a wide margin—
the negative consequences of the misallocation of resources resulting from
reduced output in the monopolized market. 17 Thus, unlike a ban on cartel
price fixing, which will invariably enhance the allocation of resources and
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations is declared to be illegal.”); see AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 7, at 21
(praising both President Bush’s and President Clinton’s enforcement of section 1); infra note
220 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 221–26 and accompanying text.
15. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement
with Texas Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracts with Health Insurers (Feb. 25,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-at-249.html.
16. See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 241–45 and accompanying text.
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improve overall economic welfare, the consumer welfare effects test will
reduce overall welfare by banning practices that create more economic
value than they destroy.
Although this conduct will increase prices in the monopolist’s market,
thereby pushing the nation’s aggregate prices in an upward direction, the
efficiencies banned by a consumer welfare effects test have economic
consequences beyond the monopolized market. These efficiencies free up
real resources that the monopolist had previously employed, which then
flow to their next best use in other markets. This increases the supply of
available inputs in such markets and reduces the cost of producing any
given level of output. The result will likely be more output at lower prices
in other markets, counteracting, at least in part, the price increase in the
monopolized market. 18 In addition, the flow of resources to other markets
will also increase the economy’s total potential output. Even if output
reduction in the monopolized market prevents realization of this full
potential, it is likely that output increases in other markets will outweigh the
monopolistic output reduction, resulting in higher actual and potential
national output than if courts banned the monopolist’s efficient conduct.19
Indeed, straightforward application of the consumer welfare effects test will
ban some conduct that produces out-of-market efficiencies that vastly
exceed any harm suffered by consumers in the relevant market. It therefore
stands to reason that some applications of the consumer welfare effects test
will actually reduce national output and increase overall prices.
It would be difficult to determine the overall impact of challenged
conduct on the aggregate price level and potential output in any particular
case, and antitrust courts should not attempt to do so. This Essay concludes
that the consumer welfare effects test’s proponents will find it difficult to
invoke macroeconomic considerations in support of this novel and more
intrusive standard of liability, given the propensity of the conduct it bans to
create more economic value than it destroys. Instead, antitrust regulation
should focus on what it does best: identifying and condemning conduct that
on balance results in a misallocation of resources and a reduction in total
economic surplus.
Banning additional conduct in the name of
macroeconomic stabilization will prevent the movement of resources to
their most productive use and, presumably, reduce society’s potential output
in the long run. By keeping its microeconomic focus, antitrust regulation
can help maximize the potential value of GDP, while monetary and fiscal
policy produce sufficient aggregate demand to ensure full employment of
society’s resources and the achievement of that potential.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the Antitrust Division’s
rejection of the disproportionality standard articulated by the Bush
Administration and its apparent embrace of the more aggressive consumer
welfare effects standard, on the grounds that application of this standard
could have helped stave off or mitigate the most recent economic downturn.
18. See infra notes 246–62 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 263–68 and accompanying text.
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This part also outlines the so-called consumer welfare effects standard,
which would, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, ban all conduct that
raises prices in the relevant market regardless of efficiency consequences
and satisfy the Obama Administration’s singular focus on the welfare of
consumers in monopolized markets.
Part II examines antitrust enforcement before and during the Great
Depression, with particular attention to the NIRA.
The Obama
Administration’s account of the historical relationship between antitrust and
the Depression is basically sound, in that President Roosevelt advocated
and enforced a massive scheme of coercive cartelization that governed more
than 500 industries. 20 At the same time, this account all but ignores the
New Deal’s anticompetitive cartelization of labor, first via NIRA codes and
then through the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, which both
strengthened the hand of organized labor and resulted in a doubling of
union membership and vast increases in the number of firms subject to
collusive wages.
Part III employs the basic macroeconomic model of aggregate supply and
demand to analyze the New Deal experience and derive lessons about the
appropriate role, if any, of antitrust policy in stabilizing the macroeconomy.
Application of this model, and more recent empirical work, confirms the
then-contemporaneous prediction by John Maynard Keynes and others that
the NIRA’s wage and price fixing provisions would deepen and lengthen
the Depression.
Finally, Part IV evaluates the claim that more aggressive section 2
enforcement pursuant to a consumer welfare effects test would have helped
stave off the Great Recession, or at least have hastened recovery. This part
demonstrates that the impact of more aggressive enforcement is likely quite
modest; more than three years through its first term, the Obama
Administration has brought only one section 2 suit against a local
monopolist with no impact on the national economy. In any event, it is by
no means clear that the impact of more aggressive enforcement, modest
though it may be, would be positive. Unlike New Deal wage and price
cartels, conduct uniquely condemned by the consumer welfare effects test
produces significant efficiencies, which more than outweigh the deadweight
loss resulting from such conduct. As a result, condemning such conduct
will likely reduce the income of producers more than it will increase the
income of consumers, thereby undermining any claim that banning such
conduct will increase overall consumer spending. Moreover, while banning
such conduct will reduce prices in monopolized markets, such
condemnation will also eliminate significant efficiencies that would free up
resources available to other markets and thus increase output and reduce
prices in other sectors. Such efficiencies would also impact the aggregate
supply curve and increase the economy’s potential output. Thus, while
application of a consumer welfare effects test would reduce prices in
monopolized markets, the destruction of efficiencies and thus prevention of
20. See Varney, supra note 2, at 2–4; infra notes 111–24 and accompanying text.
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potential price reductions in other markets would attenuate any effect on
aggregate demand in the short run and reduce the economy’s potential
output in the long run.
I. TOWARD A NEW SECTION 2 STANDARD: PROTECTING (SOME)
CONSUMERS FROM MONOPOLY TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY
The 2008 election of Barack Obama signaled that the federal government
would take a more aggressive regulatory posture, and antitrust regulation
was no exception. This part reviews the Obama Administration’s
repudiation of the Bush Administration’s section 2 enforcement policy.
This part also explores the new Administration’s promise to attack
monopolies more aggressively under a novel and more intrusive standard of
liability, based on the claim that such enhanced enforcement could have
helped stave off—or at least mitigated—the Great Recession. Finally, this
part examines the content and effects of this new standard.
A. The Antitrust Division Takes on the Great Recession:
President Obama’s New Section 2 Standard
By 2008, it was commonplace among progressives to say that President
Bush’s Antitrust Division had been too easy on monopolies. While
campaigning for President in 2007, Senator Obama claimed that the Bush
Administration had “what may be the weakest record of antitrust
enforcement of any administration in the last half century.” 21 In particular,
he focused on the fact that “in seven years, the Bush Justice Department has
not brought a single monopolization case” under section 2 of the Sherman
Act, which bans unlawful monopolization. 22 Shortly before the 2008
election, numerous former enforcement officials, known for their proregulation views, contributed to a report published by the American
Antitrust Institute (AAI), a pro-regulation think tank, which echoed
candidate Obama’s concerns. 23 The AAI report was sharply critical of the
Bush Administration’s purportedly “lax” approach, which it characterized
as a “virtual interment of Section 2.” 24 It repeated the claim—made
previously by some of its academic co-authors and a former chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission25 (FTC)—that section 2 law should ban conduct
21. See Obama, supra note 10, at 1; see also Daniel Crane, Obama’s Antitrust Agenda,
32 REGULATION, Fall 2009, at 16 (describing then-candidate Obama’s rhetorical commitment
to a more interventionist antitrust enforcement posture).
22. Obama, supra note 10, at 1; see also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
23. See AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 7, at vii–ix (listing numerous contributors
to the report, many of whom previously served at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and/or the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ)).
24. See id. at 58–65.
25. See Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST
L.J. 483, 523 (2006) (contending that antitrust law should ban all practices that injure
consumers in the relevant market unless doing so would sacrifice very large efficiencies in a
particular case); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:
Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 201, 203
(2008); Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal
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that injures the welfare of purchasers or “consumers” in the relevant market,
even if such conduct would increase total welfare by creating more wealth
than it destroys. 26 Like Obama, the AAI lamented the fact that the Bush
Administration had initiated no monopolization cases, compared to the at
least seven 27 such cases brought during the Clinton Administration.28
Around the same time, three FTC commissioners issued a joint statement
repeating the AAI’s ahistorical claim that section 2 case law focuses
exclusively on the welfare of consumers in the monopolized market,
without regard to whether efficiencies benefitted other consumers, such as
the owners of the firms charged with monopolization.29
Thus, President Obama’s approach to antitrust enforcement after his
election was hardly surprising. Days after his inauguration, the President
nominated Christine Varney, a former FTC commissioner during the
Clinton Administration, to serve as head of the Antitrust Division in the
Department of Justice (DOJ). 30 Just three weeks after her confirmation in
Trade Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 217 (2005) (endorsing a comparison of
efficiency effects with adverse impacts on consumers in the market served by the
monopolist); Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed
Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 355–56 (2006). Professors Baker,
Kirkwood, Lande, and Salop were contributors to the AAI Report. See AAI TRANSITION
REPORT, supra note 7, at ix. Professor Pitofsky was Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission during the Clinton Administration. See Commissioners and Chairmen of the
Federal Trade Commission:
1915–2010, FTC, http://ftc.gov/ftc/history/commisioner
chartlegal2010.pdf (last updated Oct. 2010) [hereinafter FTC Commissioners].
26. See AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 7, at 67 (claiming that “net consumer
welfare is ordinarily the touchstone of antitrust analysis” (citing Salop, supra note 25, at
329–31)). As I have explained elsewhere, Professors Salop, Lande, Kirkwood, Pitofsky, and
Baker equate “consumer welfare” with the welfare of purchasers in the market served by the
purported monopolist, thereby ignoring the welfare of consumers who do not happen to
purchase items produced by the monopolist. See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser
Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total
Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 662–63 (2010). The
U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly rejected such an approach on numerous occasions. See
infra notes 58–74 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
articulated a standard of liability inconsistent with the consumer welfare effects test endorsed
by these scholars).
27. One scholar has reported that the Clinton DOJ brought only seven section 2 cases.
See William Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement
Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 449 (2003). An independent review of the record reveals
twelve such cases, a list of which is on file with the author. Cf. Crane, supra note 21, at 16–
18 (contending that then-candidate Obama overstated the laxity of the Bush Administration’s
antitrust enforcement).
28. See AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 7, at 58–59. As the report noted, the Bush
Administration continued to pursue two of these seven cases by appealing adverse rulings.
See id. at 59 n.6.
29. See Pamela Jones Harbour, Jon Leibowitz, & J. Thomas Rosch, Statement of
Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz and Rosch on the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the
Department of Justice, FTC, at 1 (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/080908
section2stmt.pdf.
30. See Eric Lichtblau, Obama Picks Critic of Warrantless Wiretapping for Slot at
Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS (Jan. 22, 2009, 7:10 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.
com/2009/01/22/obama-picks-critic-of-warrantless-wiretapping-for-slot-at-justice-dept/.
Ms. Varney served on the FTC from 1994 until 1997. See FTC Commissioners, supra note
25.
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late April 2009, 31 the Antitrust Division issued a press release announcing a
change in its section 2 enforcement policy. 32 In particular, the release
withdrew a lengthy report entitled Competition and Monopoly: Single Firm
Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 33 (Section 2 Report), which
President Bush’s Antitrust Division had issued in September 2008. 34
Adopted after twenty-nine panel discussions and copious written testimony,
the ten-chapter Section 2 Report consumed 180 pages, covering topics such
as how to define monopoly, standards to govern various categories of
conduct alleged to constitute unlawful exclusion, and appropriate remedies
for conduct found to violate section 2. 35 Among other things, the report
announced the Division’s belief that a monopolist’s conduct that produced
significant efficiencies would nonetheless contravene section 2 if it imposed
harm on consumers in the relevant market that was “disproportionate” to
the efficiency benefits of such conduct.36 In so doing, the Division had
rejected the less intrusive “no-economic-sense test,” under which a
monopolist’s conduct avoids condemnation, regardless of its impact on
market consumers, if it produces economic benefits for the monopolist
unrelated to any exclusionary impact on rivals.37 The Division had also
rejected the more intrusive “consumer welfare effects test,” which would
ban any conduct that resulted in higher consumer prices, even when such

31. See Kate Phillips & Bernie Becker, Early Word: Tree-Planting Reunions, N.Y.
TIMES CAUCUS (Apr. 21, 2009, 9:19 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/21/
early-word-tree-planting-reunions/ (noting under the heading “Up in Congress” that “the
Senate confirmed . . . Christine Varney [to head] the Antitrust Division”).
32. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on
Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/May/09-at459.html.
33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008) [hereinafter SECTION 2 REPORT], available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf (withdrawn May 11, 2009). The
Federal Trade Commission had never joined the report. See Harbour et al., supra note 29.
34. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 32.
35. See, e.g., SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 33, at ch. 2 (“Monopoly Power”); id. at ch.
4 (“Price Predation”); id. at ch. 5 (“Tying”); id. at ch. 6 (“Bundled Discounts and SingleProduct Loyalty Discounts”); id. at ch. 10 (“An International Perspective”).
36. See id. at 46–47; id. at ix (“[T]he [disproportionality test] focuses on the consumerwelfare goals of antitrust and represents the best combination of effectiveness and
administrability . . . .”).
37. See id. at 39–40 (describing the “no-economic sense test”); id. at viii–ix (claiming
that the no economic sense test would immunize conduct that produced trivial benefits even
if it was significantly harmful to consumers); id. at 43 (claiming that, under a no economic
sense test “conduct could be protected even if it contributed virtually no profits (for example,
only $1 of profit) apart from its exclusionary effect but caused tremendous harm to the
competitive process”); see also Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under
Section 2: The “No Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 413 (2006) (explaining
that, under the “no economic sense” test, a monopolist only violates section 2 if its conduct
“would make no economic sense for the defendant but for the tendency to eliminate or lessen
competition”); cf. A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other
Exclusionary Conduct: Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 389–403
(2006) (advocating adoption of the “sacrifice,” also known as the “no economic sense,” test).
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conduct creates efficiencies that outweigh any economic losses from such
conduct. 38
On the same day that the DOJ withdrew the Section 2 Report, Ms.
Varney explained the Antitrust Division’s action in a speech to the Center
for American Progress. 39 Among other things, she claimed that the Section
2 Report, particularly its “disproportionality” test, leaned too far in the
direction of fostering efficiencies and “understate[d] the importance of
redressing exclusionary and predatory acts that result in harm to
competition, distort markets, and increase barriers to entry.” 40 The
“ultimate result” of the disproportionality test, she said, was that
“consumers are harmed through higher prices, reduced product variety and
slower innovation.” 41 This undue focus on mere “efficiencies” at the
expense of consumers injured by high prices, she said, reflected a departure
from tried and true antitrust principles contained in major section 2
decisions, which she claimed required a more aggressive stance toward
monopolists’ exclusionary conduct. 42 Ms. Varney did not express concern
for all consumers, but only those who happened to purchase the product
sold by the monopolist in question. Thus, her argument prioritizes the
welfare of these particular consumers over that of, say, the monopolist’s
shareholders, who are also consumers and would reap the benefits of lower
costs and higher prices that result from practices facilitating the exercise of
monopoly power and simultaneously creating efficiencies.43
While the withdrawal of the Section 2 Report was not surprising, the
rationale for more aggressive enforcement was intriguing, to say the least.
The nation was in a “distressed economy,” Ms. Varney said, 44 similar to
that experienced during prior “economic crises.” 45 It was therefore
appropriate to draw on the nation’s “prior experience in responding” to such
crises. 46 She claimed the current crisis was reminiscent of the Great
Depression, which had followed a period of relaxed antitrust enforcement
and resulting cartelization of numerous industries during the 1920s.47 Once
38. See SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 33, at 45–46 (rejecting the consumer welfare
effects test).
39. See generally Varney, supra note 2. Ms. Varney stepped down from her position as
Assistant Attorney General in July 2011 to join Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. See Press
Release, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, Christine A. Varney Joins Cravath (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.cravath.com/Christine-A-Varney-Joins-Cravath-09-06-2011/.
Because the
Obama Administration has indicated no intention to alter its section 2 enforcement strategy,
this Essay will attribute the policy and rationale that Ms. Varney articulated in her speech to
the Obama Administration generally.
40. See Varney, supra note 2, at 7.
41. Id.
42. See id. (“Accordingly, I believe the Section 2 Report loses sight of an ultimate goal
of antitrust laws—the protection of consumer welfare.”).
43. See Meese, supra note 26, at 670–73 (describing different definitions of “consumer
welfare”).
44. Varney, supra note 2, at 19.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id.
47. Id. (“Th[e] lack of interest in antitrust enforcement [that followed World War I]
continued through the 1920s.”).
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the Depression began, she said, the national government had erred by
suspending antitrust enforcement and enforcing so-called “codes of fair
competition,” which were adopted and imposed under the NIRA. 48 Such
codes imposed cartel pricing and output restrictions, which raised prices
and reduced consumer welfare and purchasing power. 49 In short, she said,
“the welfare of firms took priority over the welfare of consumers.” 50
Ms. Varney opined that the nation’s experience with lax antitrust
enforcement and the Great Depression “raises the question of whether
current economic challenges reflect a ‘failure of antitrust’”—that is, “could
United States antitrust authorities have done more” before the most recent
downturn? 51 Ms. Varney answered her own rhetorical question in the
affirmative, claiming that the Bush DOJ had, “with the exception of cartel
enforcement,” given “firms . . . room to run with the idea that markets ‘selfpolice’” and the view that “authorities should wait for markets to ‘selfcorrect.’” 52 The public, she said, had been “waiting for this ‘selfcorrection,’” as well as “spurred innovation” and “enhanced consumer
welfare,” but instead saw “numerous markets distorted” and watched “firms
fail and take American consumers with them.” 53 Along with “ineffective
government regulation, [and] ill-considered deregulatory measures,” Ms.
Varney claimed “inadequate antitrust oversight contributed to the current
These “extreme conditions,” she said, “require a
conditions.” 54
recalibration of economic and legal analysis and theories,” and a “sound
competition policy as part of our nation’s economic strategy.” 55 This
strategy would include repudiation of the disproportionality standard, which
was slanted too much in the direction of firms and “possible efficiencies.”56
The obvious implication was that more intrusive enforcement of section 2
could have helped prevent the economic downturn in the first place and that
such aggressive enforcement, along with a larger national strategy, would
help foster recovery from the Depression-like “extreme” crisis that the
nation now faced. 57
B. The Content and Effects of a More Intrusive Section 2 Standard
In her speech explaining the withdrawal of the Section 2 Report, Ms.
Varney did not explain which enforcement standard would replace that
endorsed by the Bush Administration. 58 Instead, she claimed that the DOJ
48. Id. at 2–3.
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 4.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 4–5.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id. at 5; see Crane, supra note 21, at 16–17 (“Varney has gone so far as to suggest
that the economic crisis is partly attributable to lax antitrust enforcement.”).
58. Varney, supra note 2, at 9 (“[T]he Department is not proposing any one specific test
to govern all section 2 matters at this time.”).
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would simply enforce the principles announced in two important Supreme
Court decisions and three appellate court decisions, including the D.C.
Circuit’s 2001 United States v. Microsoft Corp. 59 decision. 60 This assertion
raised more questions than it answered, however. After all, the Bush
Administration’s disproportionality test was itself more intrusive than the
approach that the Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated.
For instance, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,61 the
Court quoted and applied the test for exclusionary conduct articulated by
Harvard scholars Donald Turner and Phillip Areeda in their monumental
treatise, Antitrust Law. 62 According to the Aspen Skiing Court (and Areeda
and Turner), the category of conduct banned by section 2 “comprehends at
the most behavior that not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of
rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or does
so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.” 63 Put affirmatively, conduct that
excludes rivals but is either “competition on the merits” or “furthers”
competition on the merits in the least restrictive way does not violate
section 2. 64 While exclusion of rivals and, presumably, injury to consumers
might be necessary to a finding of liability, it is by no means sufficient.65
Simply put, the test announced by the Aspen Skiing Court does not turn on
the impact of challenged conduct on the welfare of consumers in the
relevant market. Application of this standard necessarily contemplates that
monopolists who achieve and/or maintain their position via “competition on
the merits” might injure consumers in the relevant market, perhaps even
“disproportionately.” 66 The classic example of such “competition on the
59. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam).
60. See Varney, supra note 2, at 9 (invoking and discussing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S.
143 (1951), and Microsoft). Later in the speech, Ms. Varney also invoked United States v.
Dentsply International, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), and Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco
Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002), along with Microsoft, as “strong examples of successful
challenges to exclusionary conduct . . . [that] the Department will look to . . . in establishing
its Section 2 enforcement priorities.” See Varney, supra note 2, at 13.
61. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
62. See PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1978).
63. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 n.32 (emphasis added) (quoting AREEDA &
TURNER, supra note 62, ¶ 626b).
64. See id. at 605; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 482–83 (1992) (citing Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605, for the proposition that conduct
supported by “valid business reasons” does not violate section 2); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273–75 (2d Cir. 1979) (reading pre-Aspen Skiing
precedent as establishing a safe harbor for conduct justified by valid business reasons); id. at
281 (“[A]s we have already indicated, a monopolist is permitted, and indeed encouraged, by
§ 2 to compete aggressively on the merits . . . .” (citing United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam))); id.
at 274 (“A firm that has lawfully acquired a monopoly position is not barred from taking
advantage of scale economies by constructing, for example, a large and efficient factory.
These benefits are a consequence of size and not an exercise of power over the market.”).
65. Cf. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 (considering impact of conduct on consumers in
the relevant market as one factor in overall analysis of whether conduct constituted unlawful
exclusion).
66. See CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE 16–19 (1956) (arguing that monopoly
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merits” is the realization of economies of scale and the resulting above-cost
pricing that excludes rivals and acquires or protects monopoly. This sort of
conduct has been lawful per se for decades. 67 Indeed, in their classic 1975
article on predatory pricing, Professors Areeda and Turner expressly
recognized that a monopolist’s above-cost pricing could exclude rivals and
result in increased consumer prices, but nonetheless argued that such
pricing should be lawful per se, in part because the prospect of such high
prices could incentivize monopolists to innovate and engage in other
“competition on the merits.” 68 The Supreme Court has applied the same
test to refusals to deal and exclusionary agreements, like tying contracts,
holding that such agreements are lawful, despite any exclusionary impact, if
they are the least restrictive means of achieving a legitimate business
objective—that is, of furthering competition on the merits.69
maintained by means of economies of scale is unobjectionable); CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 78 (1959) (“Market
power resting on certain bases we consider ‘reasonable,’ because we think it either
undesirable or impossible to eliminate them. . . . [Market power resulting from economies of
scale] could be reduced only at the cost of producing at higher costs in inefficiently small
units; this price we do not desire to pay.”); id. at 133–34 (mergers that create market power
and substantial efficiencies should be lawful). None of these sources even suggests that
section 2 should condemn a monopoly achieved via economies of scale simply because the
monopolist charges higher prices than would be charged in a more competitive market
comprised of firms with higher costs.
67. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223–24
(1993) (holding that above-cost pricing cannot violate section 2); Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at
274; see also Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 596–97 (quoting with approval jury instructions
treating realization of economies of scale as lawful per se); United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344
(reasoning that United Shoe’s conduct might contravene section 2 because its “control does
not rest solely on its original constitution, its ability, its research, or its economies of scale”
(emphasis added)).
68. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 705–06 (1975); id. at 707
(contending that restrictions on monopoly pricing by firms that achieved or maintained
monopoly by means of competitive merit would eliminate appropriate rewards for superior
skill, foresight, and industry, and improperly stifle innovation). Thus, Professors Areeda and
Turner anticipated the Supreme Court’s decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), which opined that the prospect of
legitimately obtained monopoly profits provides appropriate incentives that encourage procompetitive activity. Id. at 407.
69. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 458, 461–63, 482–83 (finding that Kodak
implemented tying agreements and refusals to deal with competitors, and then applying the
Aspen Skiing test to determine if this conduct violated section 2); Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at
600–11 (applying this test to a refusal to deal after contractual negotiations over the fruits of
joint venture activity broke down); see also United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d
181, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2005) (invoking and applying the Eastman Kodak standard). As noted
above, Ms. Varney invoked Dentsply as an exemplar of the more aggressive enforcement
posture the Antitrust Division would take. See supra note 60. Yet that decision opined that
conduct supported by legitimate business reasons would not violate section 2, even if it
excluded rivals and harmed consumers, unless there was a less restrictive means of achieving
the same benefits. See Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 187; id. at 196–97 (repeating that proof of a
legitimate business justification would immunize conduct that excluded rivals and produced
harm, but finding that the challenged conduct did not produce such benefits). Thus,
Dentsply simply applied the Areeda-Turner test, which does not turn on the challenged
conduct’s impact on the welfare of consumers in the relevant market. See AREEDA &
TURNER, supra note 62, ¶ 626b.
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The Areeda-Turner test, with its safe harbor for “competition on the
merits,” 70 was not novel when the Aspen Skiing Court endorsed it. The
Harvard school of antitrust had advocated such a test since at least the late
1950s, when Donald Turner and Carl Kaysen endorsed a similar
formulation announced in a decision by Judge Charles Wyzanski and
affirmed by the Supreme Court. 71 No Supreme Court decision either before
or since holds or even suggests that liability under section 2 should turn on
the extent of harm to consumers in the relevant market, nor does any such
decision hold that courts should weigh the efficiency benefits of challenged
conduct against the harms that conduct creates.72 As I have explained
elsewhere, current monopolization law reflects the Harvard school’s view
that antitrust law, including the Sherman Act, should concern itself with
encouraging efficient resource allocation, without regard to the impact of
resulting doctrine on the distribution of income. 73 Under this approach,
conduct that creates significant efficiencies escapes condemnation even if it
also creates market power, because such efficiencies generally exceed the
harm resulting from the misallocation of resources produced by market
power. 74
Taken at face value, then, the Obama Administration’s promise of more
aggressive section 2 enforcement than the Bush Administration would
require a standard for liability that is significantly more intrusive than that

70. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 62, ¶ 626b.
71. See United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344–45 (announcing safe harbor for “competition
based on pure merit”), aff’d, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam); KAYSEN & TURNER, supra
note 66, at 22 (“[T]he Sherman Act has been interpreted—and properly, we think—to leave
room for legal monopolies, that is, for monopolies acquired solely by competitive
merit . . . .”); see also LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST 95–99 (1977) (concluding that United Shoe’s safe harbor for “competition on the
merits” properly stated the law under section 2).
72. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), which Ms. Varney also
invoked, is actually an example of the “no economic sense” test that the Bush
Administration decried as insufficiently interventionist. See SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note
33, at viii–ix (claiming that the no economic sense test would immunize conduct that
produced trivial benefits even if it was significantly harmful to consumers); id. at 43. As
Ms. Varney noted, see Varney, supra note 2, at 9 n.12, Robert Bork, a proponent of a safe
harbor for conduct that produces non-trivial efficiencies and makes economic sense separate
and apart from its exclusionary impact, has invoked Lorain Journal as a decision that
exemplifies his preferred approach, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 144 (1978) (defining unlawful predation as involving conduct
that increases profits not by increased efficiency, but by driving rivals from the market or
otherwise deterring rivals from engaging in competition, and stating that such conduct
reduces “consumer welfare” and should be unlawful); id. at 107–15 (equating “consumer
welfare” with the total welfare of society and rejecting the use of antitrust law to favor
purchasers over producers, or vice versa); see also Varney, supra note 2, at 10–11 (invoking
Lorain Journal as indicative of the sort of enforcement standard the Antitrust Division
would apply).
73. See Meese, supra note 26, at 692–715. See generally Ken Heyer, Welfare Standards
and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2006, at 29
(describing the difference between the “total welfare” and “consumer welfare” tests as
applied to mergers and advocating adoption of the former).
74. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 22–23 (1968).
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allowed by the very Supreme Court decisions that Ms. Varney invoked as
the purported basis for the Antitrust Division’s future enforcement agenda.
There is nothing inappropriate about an agency adopting an enforcement
policy at odds with Supreme Court case law. The Sherman Act—not to
mention Article II of the Constitution—leaves the Executive Branch
significant discretion to determine its own view of the meaning of the
antitrust laws and to adopt corresponding enforcement policies that are
either more or less aggressive than those endorsed by Supreme Court
decisions. 75 To the extent that such policies are more intrusive than those
currently endorsed by the case law, however, agencies must ultimately
convince Article III courts, which have the last word on the imposition of
damages, fines, or imprisonment, that the proposed standard is in fact a
better view of the law.
Still, at some point an agency has to settle on some standard. Moreover,
an evaluation of the claim that a more aggressive enforcement agenda will
help stabilize the economy depends on the content of that agenda. The
most obvious such standard—and one consistent with the Obama DOJ’s
professed concern for the welfare of consumers—is the consumer welfare
effects test.76 Under this approach, agencies and courts would determine
whether a challenged practice reduces output, raises prices, and thus injures
the welfare of consumers in the market served by the monopolist, without
considering whether the challenged conduct produces benefits realized by
others or comparing the magnitude of such benefits to the harm suffered by
these consumers. 77 That is, courts applying this standard would focus on
the welfare of some consumers—purchasers in the relevant market—while
ignoring the welfare of other consumers—namely, the monopolist’s
75. See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 680–82 (1982) (defending
the Antitrust Division’s authority to decline to prosecute conduct that contravenes standards
articulated by the courts); Alan J. Meese, Raising Rivals’ Costs: Can the Agencies Do More
Good than Harm?, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 241, 250–59 (2003) (documenting various
instances in which agencies have taken doctrinal positions at odds with the case law and
defending this practice).
76. See Salop, supra note 25, at 355–56 (advocating such a standard); accord Pitofsky,
supra note 25, at 217; see also Meese, supra note 26, at 671 (distinguishing the “purchaser
welfare” standard adopted by these two scholars from a “total welfare” standard that seeks to
maximize the welfare of all consumers in society).
77. See Pitofsky, supra note 25, at 217 (endorsing comparison of efficiency effects with
adverse impacts on consumers in the market served by the monopolist); Salop, supra note
25, at 329–33 (same); see also AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 7, at 67 (endorsing the
standard articulated by Professor Salop and contending that the “best default framework is
the consumer welfare balancing test articulated by the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft”). As I have
argued elsewhere, Microsoft’s support for the purchaser-focused “consumer-welfare
balancing test,” advocated by Professor Salop and others, is ambiguous at best. See Meese,
supra note 26, at 732–36 (rebutting arguments that the D.C. Circuit’s Microsoft decision
altered the Supreme Court’s definition of conduct unlawful under section 2). After all, the
court opined that harm to consumers in the relevant market was merely a necessary
condition for liability, and that the ultimate question in section 2 cases entails “distinguishing
between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, which
increase it.” See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
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shareholders or other owners who reap the benefits of monopoly pricing
and lower costs due to efficiencies.78 Courts would thus ban any practice
that, say, results in prices that are higher than they would be without the
practice, even if it increases the welfare of all of society’s consumers by
producing significant economic benefits that outweigh the economic harm
that results when output reduction results in a misallocation of resources.79
While Ms. Varney did not expressly endorse this “consumer” or
“purchaser” welfare approach in her speech explaining the DOJ’s new
strategy, it is the most plausible section 2 standard that is more intrusive
than the disproportionality test that she condemned. 80 The balance of this
Essay will attribute this new standard to President Obama’s Antitrust
Division and assume that courts will embrace it, solely for the sake of
examining the impact of such a novel approach on primary conduct and the
macroeconomy.
The consumer welfare effects test would obviously ban more conduct
than both the current standard employed by the courts, which immunizes all
conduct necessary to produce efficiencies regardless of the impact on prices
in the relevant market, 81 and the Bush Administration’s disproportionality
test. All three tests would ban all conduct that excludes rivals and increases
prices without producing any benefits. Unlike the current legal standard,
the two alternative tests would also ban all conduct that raises prices and
visits harms on consumers that significantly outweigh, and thus are
disproportionate to, the conduct’s efficiency benefits. Only the consumer
welfare effects test, however, would go even further and ban conduct that
produces consumer harm that is not disproportionate to its efficiency
benefits. Thus, this test would prohibit conduct resulting in consumer harm
that barely exceeds, is equal to, or is less—even far less—than its efficiency
benefits. 82 When “harm to consumers” in a particular market is the
78. See Meese, supra note 26, at 669–73 (explaining how the “consumer welfare
effects” standard ignores the welfare of consumers outside the relevant market and
characterizing this approach as a “purchaser welfare effects” standard).
79. See Meese, supra note 26, at 669–71 (explaining how this standard would ban
practices regardless of their overall welfare impact); see also Williamson, supra note 74, at
18, 21–23 & tbl.1 (explaining that “a relatively modest cost reduction is usually sufficient to
offset relatively large price increases”).
80. An alternative but even more aggressive standard would ban all monopolies,
including those that result in lower consumer prices. See generally John J. Flynn, Statement
of John J. Flynn, Modification of Sherman Act, Section 2: Proposed Simplification of
Standards for Proving Attempted Monopolization Under Section 2, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 845
(1979) (advocating a “no conduct” approach to monopolization doctrine, whereby proof of
monopoly would itself establish liability under section 2); Eleanor M. Fox, Monopoly and
Competition: Tilting the Law Towards a More Competitive Economy, 37 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 49 (1980) (same). This standard seems incompatible with the Obama Administration’s
position.
81. See Meese, supra note 26, at 670–73 (describing distinction between the total
welfare and purchaser welfare approaches).
82. For instance, a practice could confer significant market power, but also result in
large cost savings that moderate any price increase and resulting consumer harm. See
generally Heyer, supra note 73, at 36 n.16 (emphasizing that reduction in marginal costs will
moderate exercises of market power). In such cases, the consumer welfare effects test would
still condemn the practice, even though efficiencies are large relative to consumer harm.
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touchstone of antitrust analysis, the welfare of the rest of society is beside
the point. 83
The conduct that the consumer welfare test uniquely bans would create
two types of harm. 84 First, price increases on remaining output transfer
income from consumers to the monopolist and its shareholders. This is a
purely distributional effect that does not impact social welfare. Second, the
reduced output that results in higher prices causes a misallocation of
resources, as inputs once used to produce the now-missing output are
employed elsewhere to create less valuable output.
Because this
misallocation results from changes in output “at the margin,” the resulting
economic harm is generally a small fraction of the distributional “harms”
resulting from higher prices. 85 Yet, this newly condemned conduct would
do more than just create harm. Because the consumer welfare effects test
alone bans this kind of conduct, it must produce efficiencies large enough
relative to consumer harm to avoid condemnation under the
disproportionality test and, of course, current law. By their nature, such
efficiencies would entail a reduction in the use of scarce resources, lower
costs per unit of output, and a corresponding increase in the real economic
welfare of producers and thus society. 86
Conduct uniquely subject to the consumer welfare effects test will both
harm consumers by reducing output and raising prices, but also benefit
society by creating efficiencies, thus creating a seemingly ambiguous result.
Recognition that the harms resulting from such conduct are largely
distributional in nature, however, allows for an evaluation of the overall
welfare consequences of such conduct and thus the consumer welfare
effects test.
Simply put, conduct that survives scrutiny under a
disproportionality test but offends a consumer welfare effects test will
almost certainly create more economic welfare than it destroys. After all,
by definition, the total consumer harm from such conduct at most barely
exceeds its efficiency benefits. Moreover, actual economic harm is merely
a fraction of total consumer harm, most of which is only distributional.
Therefore, the efficiency benefits of such conduct will necessarily exceed
its actual economic harm. Banning such conduct—as the consumer welfare
effects test would do—would thus reduce overall economic welfare. The
result is that the consumer welfare effects test is a recipe for reducing
society’s economic welfare. Proponents of the test have admitted as much,
83. See Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of
Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 447–50 (1988) (contending that the Sherman Act
requires courts to ban conduct that increases society’s overall welfare whenever such
conduct reduces the welfare of consumers in the relevant market).
84. See generally Williamson, supra note 74, at 21–23 (graphically illustrating the
impact of a transaction that produces efficiencies and market power, and distinguishing
between allocative and transfer effects).
85. See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger
Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1633 (1983) (stating that “wealth-transfer effects
almost always swamp allocative efficiency effects”); Williamson, supra note 74, at 28
(stating that “income [re]distribution which occurs [from an exercise of market power] is
usually large relative to the size of the dead-weight loss”).
86. See Williamson, supra note 74, at 21–23 & n.4.
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arguing that distributional concerns, and not efficiency, motivated Congress
to pass the Sherman Act. 87
II. ANTITRUST AND THE DEPRESSION
This part reviews the relationship between antitrust regulation and the
Great Depression, thereby providing the context necessary to evaluate the
Obama Administration’s claim that more aggressive section 2 enforcement
would have helped stave off, or at least mitigated, the most recent economic
downturn. Ms. Varney’s account of this history in her speech outlining the
DOJ’s new enforcement agenda was basically correct, subject to some
important qualifications and amplifications. Lax enforcement of the
Sherman Act during the late 1920s facilitated cartelization and may have
helped bring on the Great Depression in the first place. Moreover, once the
Depression started, the NIRA thwarted competition throughout the
economy by imposing so-called “codes of fair competition” on hundreds of
industries. 88 These codes mandated overt price fixing and practices
facilitating horizontal collusion. Such price fixing and related practices
would have contravened the Sherman Act but for the NIRA’s express
provision of antitrust immunity for such practices.89
Ms. Varney’s narrative was not entirely complete, however. For one
thing, the NIRA did more than facilitate the cartelization of industry: it also
encouraged the cartelization of labor by requiring firms that participated in
codes to engage in collective bargaining with their employees. 90 Thus, all
resulting codes included minimum wage provisions that applied to union
and non-union employees alike. 91 Moreover, the NIRA’s business and
labor cartelization measures did more than merely reduce output, increase
consumer prices, and “reduce[] consumer purchasing power,” as Ms.
Varney correctly observed. 92 Such provisions, combined with post-NIRA
legislation bolstering collective bargaining rights, also deepened and
lengthened the Great Depression. 93 These documented macroeconomic
impacts lend some superficial plausibility to her suggestion that less
aggressive enforcement during the Bush Administration helped cause and
exacerbate the current Great Recession.94
A. Pre-Depression Antitrust (Non-)enforcement
In 1911, the Supreme Court announced that sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act ban “unusual and wrongful” contracts and other practices, not
87. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 25, at 201, 203; Lande, supra note 83, at 448–
50; see also AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 7, at 8 (emphasizing that “the people”
have a right to lobby Congress to exempt various sectors from free market competition).
88. Id. § 3.
89. Id. § 5.
90. See id. § 7.
91. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
92. Varney, supra note 2, at 3.
93. See infra notes 185–203 and accompanying text.
94. Varney, supra note 2, at 4–5.
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“normal” or “usual” conduct of the sort protected by liberty of contract,
even if such “normal” conduct helps acquire or maintain a monopoly.95
Conduct was “normal” if it produced significant efficiencies unrelated to its
exclusionary impact. 96 Applying this test in the 1920s, the Supreme Court
condemned horizontal price fixing between significant industry
participants, 97 as well as so-called “open price plans” adopted and enforced
by trade associations and challenged by the Harding Administration.98
Such plans required each member of a trade association to file its prices,
output, customers, and other competitive variables with a central agent, who
would then share the information with other participants. Downward
deviation from filed prices was generally prohibited.99 According to the
Court, these plans were unreasonable and contrary to section 1 because they

95. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911); accord United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Co. of N.J., 247 U.S. 32, 66–67 (1918) (rejecting a challenge to
efficient conduct that fostered monopoly); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 59–62 (1911); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 566–68 (1898)
(reading the Sherman Act so as not to ban “ordinary contracts and combinations,” even if
such agreements indirectly restrained interstate commerce); see also Alan J. Meese, Standard
Oil as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (describing how
liberty of contract considerations influenced adoption and content of the Rule of Reason);
Alan J. Meese, Competition Policy and the New Deal: Lessons Learned and a New Way
Forward (Aug. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (examining various
sources of competition policy, including the Sherman Act, Commerce Clause, and Due
Process Clauses, before, during, and after the Depression).
96. See United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 65 (finding that the defendant adopted the challenged
practices for reasons that “move[] and may move the transactions of men”); id. at 63–64
(explaining that the practice of leasing machines helped finance entry of small shoe
manufacturers and ensured that machines were used in proper relation to other machines); id.
at 64 (explaining that requirement that lessees also lease accessory machines created “great
economic advantage”); see also William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern
Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 16–17 (1995) (explaining how the United Shoe decision rested
upon a determination that the challenged provisions were voluntary arrangements that
benefitted both parties). As I have suggested before, the test applied in United Shoe was
akin to the modern “no economic sense” test. See Meese, supra note 26, at 677 n.70; see also
Werden, supra note 37, at 413.
97. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 394–98 (1927) (banning all
price fixing between “members of a combination controlling a substantial part of an
industry”); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235–40 (1899)
(finding horizontal price restraint between major industry participants “direct” and thus
unlawful because it raised prices above the competitive level).
98. See United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 389–90 (1923) (banning
open price plans); Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410–12
(1921) (same).
99. See Am. Linseed Oil, 262 U.S. at 382–83 (detailing these requirements of the
challenged plan); Am. Column & Lumber, 257 U.S. at 394–95 (same); see also Am. Linseed
Oil, 262 U.S. at 389 (participants agreed to follow price schedules “unless more onerous
[prices] were obtained”); RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY,
RHETORIC, LAW 76 (rev. ed. 1996) (describing the role of a major consulting firm in
managing thirty major trade associations before 1940). Thus, Ms. Varney’s statement that
there was little interest in antitrust enforcement from the end of World War I until 1937 is
not entirely accurate. The DOJ did challenge outright cartels and “open price plans” in the
early through mid-1920s. See ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL
RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 7–21 (1993) (discussing aggressive civil and criminal
prosecution of cartel and cartel facilitating activity in the early 1920s).
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were “a new form of combination . . . resorting to methods which are not
normal,” whose “necessary tendency is to suppress competition.” 100
The government’s aggressive pursuit of such horizontal arrangements did
not last long. During the Coolidge Administration, Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover and others lobbied Assistant Attorney General William
Donovan, head of the Antitrust Division, to refrain from prosecuting open
price plans that contravened the Supreme Court’s recent decisions.101
During the same period, the FTC orchestrated dozens of “trade practice
conferences,” at which industry proposed, and the Commission adopted, socalled “codes of fair competition.” 102 Such codes banned as “unfair”
various forms of otherwise lawful competition, including below-cost
pricing, price discrimination, the granting of favorable credit terms, and
promotional activities such as giveaways and lotteries held by gasoline
stations—all without any additional showing that the banned practice
produced competitive harm. 103 On the eve of the Depression, then, antitrust
enforcement had reached its nadir. One of the enforcement agencies
declined to challenge plainly anti-competitive conduct, while the other was
actively prohibiting pro-competitive activities.
B. The Great Depression and New Deal Cartelization
Herbert Hoover took office in March 1929, presiding over a nation
enjoying unprecedented prosperity. Standard and Poor’s composite index
(S&P Index) of 90 common stocks peaked at 254 in September, and
unemployment hovered around 3 percent. 104 By late October, however, the
S&P Index had fallen to 162, national output was plummeting, and
unemployment was climbing. 105 By 1932, output had fallen 28 percent

100. Am. Linseed Oil, 262 U.S. at 389.
101. See HIMMELBERG, supra note 99, at 57–59 (reporting that Donovan provided comfort
letters to associations that employed open price plans that most likely contravened decisions
such as Am. Linseed Oil); id. at 17–18, 20–21, 39–40, 65–67 (describing Hoover’s lobbying
of the Attorney General in favor of trade association plans).
102. See THOMAS C. BLAISDELL JR., THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: AN EXPERIMENT
IN THE CONTROL OF BUSINESS 92–102 (1932) (describing this process); see also 1930 FTC
ANN. REP. 37 (reporting fifty-seven conferences held during the fiscal year); 1928 FTC ANN.
REP. 5–16 (describing this procedure and various participating industries); id. at 5 (“The
work of this [trade practice conference] division has increased enormously during the past
fiscal year.”).
103. See, e.g., FTC TRADE PRACTICE CONFERENCES 81 (July 1, 1929) (adopting a code
prohibiting gasoline stations from giving away motor oil or other products on “opening days,
special sale days, or other occasions,” or holding lotteries or other games of chance);
HIMMELBERG, supra note 99, at 63 (stating that, as of 1928, such codes “routinely” banned
below-cost pricing and price discrimination, without any additional requirement that such
activities actually injure consumers).
104. See RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, STANLEY FISCHER & RICHARD STARTZ,
MACROECONOMICS 414 tbl.18-1 (8th ed. 2001); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON
SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867–1960, at 299–308 (1963).
105. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 104, at 304–06 (“During the two months
from the cyclical peak in August 1929 to the crash, production, wholesale prices, and
personal income fell at annual rates of 20 per cent, 7½ per cent, and 5 per cent,
respectively.”).
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from its 1929 peak and the S&P Index hovered around 50.106
Unemployment stood at 23.6 percent and would climb to almost 25 percent
by 1933. 107
Perhaps ironically, Hoover rejected Coolidge’s hands-off approach to
antitrust enforcement, refusing to reappoint William Donovan to run the
Antitrust Division. 108 Donovan’s successor challenged trade association
activities that Donovan had approved, and encouraged the FTC to revisit
“trade practice codes” that banned below-cost pricing and price
discrimination that did not enhance or protect market power.109 Finally,
despite Hoover’s sympathy for collusive resource conservation, his
Antitrust Division challenged a joint venture between 137 Appalachian coal
producers in four states that funneled members’ output through an exclusive
sales agency. 110
This reinvigoration of antitrust enforcement did not last long. Hoover
lost his 1932 bid for reelection to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who worked
with Congress to develop the NIRA. 111 Passed and signed in the summer
of 1933, this centerpiece of the New Deal authorized the President to
impose so-called “Codes of Fair Competition,” either unilaterally or at the
behest of industry representatives.112 Moreover, the statute expressly
provided antitrust immunity for conduct authorized by the codes. 113
Less than two years after FDR’s signature, the National Recovery
Administration (NRA), the entity created to implement the NIRA, had
approved over 550 codes, purportedly covering businesses employing 80
percent of the private non-farm workforce. 114 The resulting codes
coercively interfered with normal free market competition by expressly
fixing prices or otherwise encouraging horizontal collusion: 38 set
106. DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, at 78, 414 tbl.18-1; FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 104, at 304 tbl.29.
107. DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, at 414 tbl.18-1.
108. HIMMELBERG, supra note 99, at 88–89.
109. Id. at 104–05 (describing the DOJ’s litigation against the Sugar Institute and other
associations whose activities the Coolidge administration had approved); id. at 90–97
(describing DOJ challenges to activities previously approved by the FTC’s trade practice
conferences).
110. See generally Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
111. See National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195
(previously codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 701–712 (Supp. 1933)), invalidated by A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
112. See id. § 3.
113. See id. § 5.
114. See HIMMELBERG, supra note 99, at 211; Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, New
Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis,
112 J. POL. ECON. 779, 784 (2004). I say “purportedly” because some of the industries
covered, such as bowling alleys, barber shops, billiard halls, and burlesque houses, were
plainly beyond the jurisdiction of Congress to regulate under then-extant case law. See
CHARLES FREDERICK ROOS, NRA ECONOMIC PLANNING 538 (1937) (listing “Barber Shop
Trade” and “Bowling and Billiard Operating Trade” as codes approved as of April 5, 1935);
id. at 539 (listing “Burlesque Theatrical” in same table); id. at 547 (listing “Motor Vehicle
Storage and Parking Trade” in same table); cf. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272
(1918) (holding that Congress cannot regulate employment practices of manufacturer even
though the firm intended to sell its output in interstate commerce).
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minimum prices; 115 188 included “[e]mergency price fixing provisions,”
defining “emergency” as “destructive price cutting” endangering
maintenance of a code; 116 and 422 included “open-price” provisions, like
those declared unlawful by the Supreme Court, requiring firms to file their
prices publicly with the code authority, with most including waiting periods
between the filing of new prices and their effective dates. 117 Other codes
reduced output by limiting production to certain days of the week or hours
of the day, limiting construction of new capacity, preventing firms from
shifting from one form of output to another, discouraging the movement of
facilities from one locality to another, prohibiting the opening of new
plants, and discouraging new routes or extending existing ones. 118
Code provisions facilitated collusion or tempered rivalry in other ways as
well.
Eighty mandated resale price maintenance, which in some
circumstances can facilitate upstream horizontal price fixing. 119 Another
352 banned sales below a firm’s individual costs, regardless of whether
such prices injured competition or even a rival. 120 One hundred codes
prohibited “destructive price cutting,” defined as cuts “impair[ing] code
wages and working conditions,” regardless of the prices’ relationship to
costs. 121 Bans on below-cost pricing and “destructive” price cutting put a
floor under prices, discouraged cheating on cartelistic arrangements, and
replicated provisions adopted under the FTC’s “Trade Practice
Conferences.” 122 Various codes banned or limited package sales and others
limited the extension of consumer credit, both of which could facilitate
secret discounting. 123 It is no surprise, then, that one historian has
concluded that “[i]n the initial phase [of the NIRA], at least, the philosophy
115. See LEVERETT S. LYON ET AL., THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION: AN
ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL 579 (1935).
116. Id. at 605–08 & n.18.
117. Id. at 610–11 (recounting that 422 codes included “open-price plans” and that 297
required a delay between filing and changing prices); see also ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW
DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 59–60 (1966) (describing the operation of such
provisions).
118. LYON ET AL., supra note 115, at 624–29 (sixty codes limited operation of plants
and/or machinery to a certain number of hours per day or week); id. at 632–37 (detailing
various other restrictions). Thus, the cement code only allowed new construction when
necessary to improve efficiency, modernize, or if capacity was not increased, and motor bus
and air transport companies required approval from code authorities before opening new
routes. See id. at 633–35.
119. See HAWLEY, supra note 117, at 58–59 (reporting that eighty codes mandated
minimum resale price maintenance); see also Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) (stating that “industry-wide” minimum resale price maintenance can
facilitate upstream horizontal collusion).
120. See LYON ET AL., supra note 115, at 585–86. Some codes both prohibited below-cost
sales and authorized emergency price fixing. See id. at 605–08.
121. Id. at 603–05.
122. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text (describing provisions adopted by
the FTC’s “Trade Practice Conferences”).
123. LYON ET AL., supra note 115, at 690–93; cf. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (holding that there is a per se ban on wholesalers’ agreement not to
extend certain credit terms); see also supra note 103 and accompanying text (describing the
presence of such provisions in some codes of fair competition approved by FTC-sponsored
trade practice conferences).
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of government-supported cartels was clearly outdistancing the concept of
enforcing competition.” 124
So far, this history is consistent with that offered by the Obama
Administration. There was, however, one important oversight in Ms.
Varney’s speech. While the NIRA certainly facilitated cartelization
between firms in numerous industries and tempered rivalry in other ways as
well, such cartelization was simply a means to a larger end—namely,
raising wages and thus the “purchasing power” of labor.125 Indeed,
provisions boosting the prerogatives and income of labor, which Ms.
Varney only mentioned once in passing, 126 were seen as working hand-inhand with those facilitating cartelization. Without cartelization, it was said,
destructive and cutthroat competition would result in “chiseling” on prices
and thus wages. 127 While higher wages would reduce profits, policymakers
surmised that wage earners spent a larger proportion of their income than
shareholders, with the result that such a transfer of income would, on
balance, increase overall consumption and thus aggregate demand. 128

124. See HAWLEY, supra note 117, at 62.
125. The NIRA’s “Declaration of Policy” even included the goal of “increas[ing] the
consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power.” See
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, ch. 90 § 1, 48 Stat. 195.
126. Varney, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that the NIRA required code participants to
engage in collective bargaining).
127. See HAWLEY, supra note 117, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
HIMMELBERG, supra note 99, at 202–05 (detailing business support for industry selfregulation of prices, wages, employment, and production); id. at 204 (explaining that
“business leaders . . . were able to persuade [Senator] Wagner that elimination of ‘cutthroat
competition’ and improvement of wages and hours through industry-wide agreements
would, together with public works, be an adequate recovery mechanism”); id. at 197 (“The
labor provisions, on the grounds that they would increase ‘purchasing power’ and spread
work, made it somewhat possible to regard the N.I.R.A. as a recovery measure, as did the
antitrust suspension, upon the supposition that unfair and ruthless competition was causing
continuing deflation of prices and wages and making revival impossible.”).
128. See WILLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932–
1940, at 36 (1963) (reporting that FDR “accepted the underconsumptionist explanation of the
cause of the depression” and was influenced by experts who believed “that the crisis
centered in a failure of purchasing power but espoused structural reform rather than deficit
spending”); HERBERT STEIN, THE FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 48–49 (1969)
(“Underlying [the NRA’s] reforms was the thought that in the twenties too small a share of
the national income had gone to workers and farmers—the consuming classes—and too
large a share had gone to savers. As a result investment had run for a time at a rate that
could not be sustained by the rate of consumption, and had then collapsed, causing the
Depression. The NRA and the AAA were to raise and sustain the share of workers and
farmers and thereby raise and sustain the share of consumption in the total national
income.”). Thus, the statute anticipated the concern, expressed by John Maynard Keynes
and his followers during the 1930s and 1940s, that increasing affluence would increase the
proportion of income saved, reduce the proportion of income devoted to consumption, and
thereby prevent aggregate demand from reaching a level necessary to achieve full
employment of the nation’s resources. See, e.g., ALVIN HANSEN, FULL RECOVERY OR
STAGNATION? 13–34 (1938) (invoking a Keynesian framework to make this argument). As
explained below, however, Keynes himself believed the NIRA would slow recovery and
recommended a quite different remedy for such a shortfall in aggregate demand: increased
government spending. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.

1656

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

The NIRA did more than simply facilitate cartelization in the hope that
business would pay higher wages. The statute pursued the objective of
raising labor’s “purchasing power” in a variety of ways. First, the Act
banned “yellow-dog” contracts—agreements that forbade employees from
joining a union. 129 The statute also required firms participating in codes to
engage in collective bargaining with unions.130 Finally, the statute
contemplated that industry and labor would propose codes that included
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions, and it empowered the
President to impose such provisions by fiat if industry and labor could not
come to agreement. 131 In fact, all codes mandated minimum wages and
nearly all contained maximum hour provisions.132
The public policy favoring labor cartels persisted despite the NIRA’s
eventual demise. Less than two years after its passage, the Supreme Court
unanimously invalidated the NIRA in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 133 thereby ending the codes and antitrust immunity for the
NIRA cartels. 134 Nevertheless, Congress immediately moved to enact the
National Labor Relations Act 135 (NLRA), which authorized the formation
of labor cartels—also known as unions 136—and compelled private firms to
bargain with such entities over wages and other terms of employment.137
The NLRA’s “Findings and Declaration of Policy” included an assertion
that firms’ exercise of unequal bargaining power had reduced wages paid to
labor and thus reduced the “purchasing power” necessary to maintain
adequate consumption expenditures.138 The Supreme Court narrowly
sustained the NLRA as applied to manufacturing, previously deemed
beyond the reach of Congress. 139
129. NIRA § 7(a)(2); cf. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (voiding state ban on
“yellow dog” contracts); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (voiding
congressional ban on such contracts in the railroad industry).
130. NIRA § 7(a)(1).
131. See id. § 7(b) (authorizing industry participants to adopt “standards as to the
maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and such other conditions of
employment”); id. § 7(c) (empowering the President to establish minimum rates of pay,
maximum hours, and other conditions of employment).
132. See LYON ET AL., supra note 115, at 367 n.a (reporting that all but the fur trading
code included maximum hour provisions); Cole & Ohanian, supra note 114, at 784 (all
codes included minimum wage provisions).
133. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
134. See id. at 550–51.
135. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)).
136. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 279 (4th ed. 1987) (“The labor union
is for the labor market the equivalent of the cartel in the product market.”).
137. See NLRA §§ 7–8 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158).
138. See id. § 1 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151) (“The inequality of bargaining power
between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and
working conditions within and between industries.” (emphasis added)).
139. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 25–26, 49 (1937)
(sustaining by a 5–4 vote application of the NLRA to the nation’s fourth largest steel
manufacturer); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937)
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Within a few years of the NLRA’s passage, union membership had
exceeded a quarter of the workforce and the number of “strike days” in the
nation had doubled from fourteen million to twenty-eight million. 140 At the
same time, the Roosevelt Administration maintained a hands-off approach
to antitrust enforcement, declining to challenge cartelization in industries
that had agreed to generous collective bargaining agreements with their
unions, at least until Thurman Arnold took the helm of the Antitrust
Division in 1938. 141 When supplemented to include the cartelization of
labor via NIRA Codes and then the NLRA, the Obama Administration’s
descriptive account of the national government’s anticompetitive response
to the Great Depression appears complete.
III. MACROECONOMIC LESSONS FROM THE NEW DEAL’S REJECTION
OF COMPETITION
The history recounted in Part II is certainly necessary to an understanding
of the link between New Deal cartelization and the macroeconomy, but
such history, no matter how detailed, is not sufficient. One also needs a
theoretical framework to assist in evaluating the impact of cartelization—a
microeconomic phenomenon—on the overall macroeconomy. This part
provides such a framework, employs it to predict the impact of massive
cartelization on wages and prices, and reviews the empirical evidence of
that effect. The results provide a platform for evaluating the impact of
President Obama’s more aggressive section 2 enforcement policy on the
larger economy.
A. Aggregate Demand, Aggregate Supply, and GDP
A key indicator of a nation’s macroeconomic performance is GDP,
defined as the annual “dollar value of economic activity” throughout the

(sustaining by a 5–4 vote application of the NLRA to a single clothing factory in Richmond);
cf. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (“[T]he mere fact that [goods
manufactured with child labor] were intended for interstate commerce transportation does
not make their production subject to federal control . . . .”); United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,
156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (“Commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part of it.”).
140. Cole & Ohanian, supra note 114, at 785 (reporting a doubling of strike days and an
increase of union membership to 29 percent of the workforce by 1940); Michael Wachter,
The Rise and Decline of Unions, 30 REGULATION, Summer 2007, at 23, 27 (reporting that
union membership reached 26 percent of the workforce by 1940).
141. Cole & Ohanian, supra note 114, at 786. Enforcement was not entirely moribund,
however. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 165–66, 223–28
(1940) (sustaining numerous convictions based on indictments for anticompetitive conduct
authorized by a pre-Schechter Code of Fair Competition); Daniel A. Crane, The Story of
United States v. Socony-Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust in the Two New Deals, in
ANTITRUST STORIES 91, 103 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007) (recounting late
1936 indictment of several firms and individuals in Socony-Vacuum); see also SPENCER
WEBER WALLER, THURMON ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 78–110 (2005) (describing Arnold’s
aggressive tenure at the Antitrust Division); John D. Harkrider, Lessons from the Great
Depression, 23 ANTITRUST, Spring 2009, at 6, 8–9 (discussing post-NIRA antitrust
enforcement by the Roosevelt Administration, including a substantial increase in
enforcement actions during Arnold’s tenure).
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nation. 142 A recession is “a period of general economic decline,”
manifesting itself as a fall in the real (inflation-adjusted) value of GDP
lasting two quarters or more. 143 The most recent recession began in the
second half of 2008, when real GDP fell at just under a 4 percent annual
rate in the third quarter and at a nearly 9 percent rate in the fourth
quarter. 144 The recession continued into the first half of 2009, with GDP
falling at rates greater than 6.5 percent in the first quarter and less than 1
percent in the second quarter. 145 A recovery of sorts began in the third
quarter of 2009, with GDP rising, though sometimes quite modestly, in
each of the last eight quarters.146
Any evaluation of the link between antitrust enforcement and the onset,
depth, and persistence of the most recent downturn must begin with an
understanding of the determinants of GDP. Basically, macroeconomists
treat GDP as a function of two modeling constructs: aggregate demand and
aggregate supply. 147 Like any demand schedule, the aggregate demand
schedule denotes the quantity of output that consumers will demand—albeit
“in the aggregate”—at any given price, with “price” denoting the
economy’s overall or general price level. 148 This similarity between the
“aggregate” demand familiar to macroeconomists and the “ordinary”
demand studied by microeconomists masks an important distinction
between the two constructs, however. The ordinary demand curve from
microeconomics takes a “partial equilibrium” approach, modeling the
impact of price on the quantity consumers demand in a particular industry
and assuming that price and output in other industries is held constant.149
In this construct, a price reduction causes individuals to purchase more of

142. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 18 (7th ed. 2010) (describing GDP as
a “single number representing the dollar value of economic activity in a given period of
time”).
143. See ANDREW B. ABEL & BEN BERNANKE, MACROECONOMICS 277, 278 n.2 (2005).
This Essay employs the term “GDP” and “real GDP” interchangeably to refer to the
inflation-adjusted value of annual economic activity.
144. See Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Percent Change from Preceding Period,
BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdpchg.xls (last updated Jan. 27,
2012).
145. See id.
146. See id. For instance, in the first quarter of 2011, GDP rose 0.4 percent. See News
Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Gross Domestic Product: Second Quarter 2011
(Advance Estimate) (July 29, 2011), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2011/
gdp2q11_adv.htm.
147. See generally DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, ch. 5.
148. See MANKIW, supra note 142, at 269 (defining “aggregate demand” as “the
relationship between the quantity of output demanded and the aggregate price level”).
149. See, e.g., KELVIN LANCASTER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN MICROECONOMICS 10
(1969) (explaining how microeconomists generally employ such “partial analysis” when
examining the impact of price on demand and supply in a particular market); see also W. KIP
VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST 76 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining how partial equilibrium tools focus on impacts in a
particular market to avoid second best problems presented by general equilibrium analysis
when some markets are characterized by monopoly, externalities, and other departures from
perfect competition).
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the product in question and less of other products. Thus, there is no impact
on overall consumption.
By contrast, the aggregate demand curve models the relationship
between price and demand for all goods in the entire economy
simultaneously, as part of a larger general equilibrium analysis. 150 Within
this construct, a “price reduction” refers to a reduction in the average price
of goods and services produced by the entire economy. 151 Moreover,
instead of inducing substitution of demand of some products for others, an
aggregate price reduction increases the demand for all goods and services
simultaneously. 152 In particular, for any given supply of money, a price
reduction increases the real value of money balances held by individuals.
This increase can, holding all other factors constant, influence aggregate
demand in two different ways. 153 First, the increase leaves individuals
holding more money in real terms—that is, money that does not bear
interest—than necessary to conduct their day-to-day transactions. 154 As a
result, individuals will rebalance their asset portfolios by using excess
money to purchase interest-bearing assets, bidding up the price of such
assets and lowering interest rates.155 This reduction in interest rates will, in
turn, increase personal and business investment, thereby increasing overall
demand for goods and services. 156 Second, separate and apart from any
change in interest rates, an increase in real balances will enhance
individuals’ wealth and thereby stimulate aggregate consumption, in the
same way that any other wealth increase will boost consumption.157
Economists refer to this distinct impact on consumption (somewhat
confusingly) as the “real balance effect” or the “Pigou effect.”158
150. See ABEL & BERNANKE, supra note 143, ch. 9 (treating the aggregate demand model
as general equilibrium in nature); MANKIW, supra note 142, at 74 (explaining that the basic
model of the macroeconomy is general equilibrium in nature, because it incorporates various
interactions determining the overall supply and demand for goods and services); see also
DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, at 86 tbl.5-1 (“[T]he economics underlying the
aggregate supply-aggregate demand diagram is unrelated to the microeconomic version.
(It’s too bad that our macroeconomic version wasn’t given a different name.)”).
151. See DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, at 86 tbl.5-1 (identifying “price” relevant for
macroeconomic aggregate demand analysis as “the cost of a basket of all the goods we buy
measured in money terms”); MANKIW, supra note 142, at 269 (stating that aggregate demand
models the relationship between total demand and “aggregate price level”).
152. See DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, at 90.
153. See MANKIW, supra note 142, at 329.
154. See DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, at 244.
155. Id. at 244–45.
156. Id.; see also Christina D. Romer, What Ended the Great Depression?, 52 J. ECON.
HIST. 757, 759 (1992) (contending that the inflow of gold during the 1930s increased the real
money supply, reduced interest rates, and spurred business investment and individual
purchases of durable goods).
157. See DON PATINKIN, MONEY, INTEREST, AND PRICES: AN INTEGRATION OF MONETARY
AND V ALUE THEORY 17–21 (MIT Press 2d ed. abr. 1989) (1965); Don Patinkin, Price
Flexibility and Full Employment, 38 AM. ECON. REV. 543, 556 (1948). See generally A.C.
Pigou, The Classical Stationary State, 53 ECON. J. 343 (1943) (elaborating on the claim that
the fall in prices will increase real balances and stimulate aggregate demand, and defending
it against Keynesian criticism).
158. See PATINKIN, supra note 157, at 19 n.13 (“The ‘real balance effect’ is identical
with . . . the ‘Pigou effect.’”); Patinkin, supra note 157, at 556 (equating the “Pigou effect”
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While there is little doubt that aggregate demand curves slope down and
to the right, the location and slope of the curve is not set in stone. As with
ordinary demand curves, any given aggregate demand curve holds constant
all the factors other than price that can influence demand. 159 A change in
one or more of these variables will result in a shift in the curve.160 A
reduction in the money supply or a tax increase, for instance, will shift the
curve to the left, while an increase in the money supply or a tax cut will
shift the curve to the right. 161
Aggregate demand is meaningless unless the economy has the
wherewithal to respond with supply. The aggregate supply schedule
denotes the output of goods and services that a nation’s business
establishments would produce at each given price level.162 Those familiar
with an ordinary supply curve might expect the aggregate supply curve to
slope up and to the right. Sometimes it does, but macroeconomists often
begin with the assumption that the aggregate supply curve is vertical, at
least in the long run.163 Ordinary supply curves model the price and output
relationship for a particular industry, which can always bid productive
resources away from the rest of the economy. 164 The aggregate supply
curve, by contrast, models the response of the entire economy to an increase
in the general price level.165 The vertical slope of this curve reflects the
fact that society’s given stock of resources—labor, capital, and technical
knowhow—can only produce so much, regardless of the price level.166
When aggregate demand at a given price level exceeds the economy’s
capacity to produce, inflation will occur, choking off excess demand and

with “real balance effect”); see also DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, at 244 & n.2
(distinguishing the “real balance effect,” whereby higher balances directly increase demand
for commodities, from impact of higher balances on interest rates and thus business and
personal investment); MANKIW, supra note 142, at 313–15, 329 (distinguishing the reduction
in interest rates as a result of real balance increases under the “IS–LM model” and the “Pigou
effect” on commodity demand). Reference to this distinct effect as the “real balance” effect
can be confusing because both of the effects on interest rates and consumption depend upon
an increase in the real value of money balances and thus, in that sense, are both “real
balance” effects.
159. Cf. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
70–71 (8th ed. 2000) (explaining this aspect of ordinary demand curves).
160. See MANKIW, supra note 142, at 322–23 (explaining how a change in any variable
other than the price level that impacts demand will cause a shift in the aggregate demand
curve).
161. Id. at 271 & fig.9-6 (showing how changes in the money supply affect aggregate
demand); id. at 296 (discussing how tax cuts increase aggregate demand).
162. See DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, at 87 (“The aggregate supply curve
describes, for each given price level, the quantity of output firms are willing to supply.”).
163. See MANKIW, supra note 142, 272–73 & fig.9-7 (representing the “long run
aggregate supply curve” as vertical).
164. See DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, at 87 (highlighting this aspect of normal
supply curves and distinguishing such curves from the aggregate supply curve).
165. See id.
166. See id. (“The classical [vertical] supply curve is based on the assumption that the
labor market is in equilibrium with full employment of the labor force.”); MANKIW, supra
note 142, at 272–73.
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limiting actual and potential output. 167 Moreover, the location of the
vertical region of the curve represents an economy’s “potential” or “full
employment” output. 168 A change in variables that improve the nation’s
productivity, such as advancing technology, will shift the location of that
vertical “curve” to the right, thereby increasing the nation’s potential output
at any given level of aggregate demand. 169
The intersection of the aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves
determines the economy’s output and thus GDP, at least when the economy
is in equilibrium. 170 Like individual markets, however, the macroeconomy
sometimes departs from equilibrium, often because of an exogenous shock
to the economic system. 171 For instance, a tax increase or other reduction
in wealth might reduce consumption, thereby shifting the aggregate demand
curve down and to the left. 172 Or an uncertain regulatory or tax climate
might reduce the propensity of businesses to invest in new plants and
equipment and produce the same result. 173 If the aggregate price level
remains the same, such shifts will result in lower output and thus lower
GDP. 174 Moreover, some resources, including human resources, will
become unemployed, as individuals and businesses are willing to supply
more goods and services at prevailing prices than consumers are willing to
purchase.
But will such unemployment persist? The answer would seem to be
“no.” After all, absent price regulation, surpluses drive prices down as
owners of surplus goods and services lower the prices they charge to rid
themselves of excess supplies. 175 If wages and prices are allowed to fall,
aggregate demand will rise and the economy will, assuming a vertical
aggregate supply curve, reach a new, full employment equilibrium, albeit at
a lower price level.176 Such a self-adjusting response to a shift in demand
depends critically upon the flexibility of prices and resulting price
reductions. 177 If, after a downward shift in aggregate demand, prices
remain fixed—or worse yet, rise—no self-correction will occur, and the

167. DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, at 87 (“[I]f high demand is economywide and all
the factors of production are already at work, there isn’t any way to increase overall
production, and all that happens is that all prices increase . . . .”).
168. Id.
169. See MANKIW, supra note 142, at 192, 218, 244.
170. Id. at 271–76.
171. Id. at 278.
172. Id. at 327 (discussing the hypothesis that the 1929 stock market crash reduced
household wealth and thus dampened consumer spending and aggregate demand); id. at 328
(explaining how tax increases during the early 1930s reduced consumption and thus
aggregate demand).
173. See, e.g., id. at 480–81 (discussing the theory that consumers are reluctant to
increase consumption if they anticipate future tax increases).
174. Id. at 274–75.
175. BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 159, at 77–80 (explaining this process of reaching a
new equilibrium in ordinary markets).
176. MANKIW, supra note 142, at 276.
177. See Patinkin, supra note 157, at 557 (explaining that resistance to price reductions
will prevent such an automatic adjustment).
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economy will remain “stuck” at a disequilibrium of less than full
employment. 178
Moreover, even completely flexible prices will not guarantee a return to
full employment. The scenario just described assumes that the aggregate
supply curve in fact remains vertical—that is, that lower prices will have no
impact on the total output that firms are willing to supply. This assumption
may prove untrue in the real world because of the impact of falling prices
on real wages and thus the cost of labor, a major input in most production.
As John Maynard Keynes argued, workers resist reductions in their nominal
“money-wage,” even when prices are falling all around them. 179 If
aggregate prices fall more precipitously than nominal wages, real wages—
and thus the relative cost of labor—will rise. 180 This rise in real wages will
increase production costs, reduce the amount of output that firms are
willing to supply at any given price, and result in a sloped supply curve,
preventing a return to full employment despite complete price flexibility.181
Eventually, persistent unemployment may induce a fall in nominal and thus
real wages, returning the supply curve to its vertical state. In the shorter
run, however, only fiscal policy, monetary policy, or a countervailing shock
can restore the economy to full employment. 182
B. Macroeconomic Effects of New Deal Cartelization
As explained earlier, lax enforcement of the antitrust laws likely
encouraged horizontal collusion before the Great Depression. Such
collusion could have reduced aggregate demand during the late 1920s in
one of two ways. First, higher prices could have increased the aggregate
price level and thereby reduced aggregate demand. 183 Second, higher
prices could have transferred income from consumers, who spend a large
178. MANKIW, supra note 142, at 274–75; F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 363 (2d ed. 1980) (explaining how inflexible
monopoly pricing can prevent price reductions despite drop in aggregate demand and thus
prevent increase in real balances that would bolster demand); cf. Romer, supra note 156, at
781–83 (finding that the exogenous increase in the money supply, and not self-correction,
prompted economic recovery during the 1930s).
179. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY 7–13 (1936).
180. See id.; see also DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 104, at 111–16 (explaining how
“sticky” wages can prevent self-correction from an economic downturn).
181. See WENDY CARLIN & DAVID SOSKICE, MACROECONOMICS AND THE WAGE BARGAIN:
A MODERN APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT, INFLATION, AND THE EXCHANGE RATE 49 (1990) (“A
central component . . . of Keynes’s model . . . is the failure of money wages to fall. This
market imperfection led, in the context of a fall in autonomous demand, to the real wage
rising and the consequent fall in employment and output . . . .”); see also MANKIW, supra
note 142, at 169 (explaining how the failure of wages to fall can affect the aggregate supply
curve and prevent recovery to full employment).
182. See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 159, at 714–16 (explaining how inflexible
wages can prevent the economy’s “self-correction,” thereby necessitating a policy response);
MANKIW, supra note 142, at 331–32 (explaining how more activist monetary policy could
have counteracted the Depression).
183. See supra notes 150–58 and accompanying text (explaining how aggregate demand
depends on the price level).
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fraction of their income, to cartelists and their shareholders, who spend a
smaller fraction of their income. This latter effect would reduce overall
consumption expenditures and thus cause a shift in the aggregate demand
curve down and to the left. 184
After the onset of the Depression, the NIRA imposed cartels and cartelfacilitating practices throughout the economy. 185 The NIRA also required
collective efforts to raise wages and the post-Schechter Poultry NLRA
followed suit. Basic microeconomics would predict that such schemes
would raise wages and prices and that was the object of such schemes—to
raise wages and thus the “purchasing power” of labor so as to counteract a
pre-Depression drop in such purchasing power and thereby foster economic
recovery. 186
Employing the tools of aggregate demand and aggregate supply
developed above, we can generate predictions about the likely effects of the
various forms of New Deal cartelization. Indeed, John Maynard Keynes
predicted, in an open letter to President Roosevelt shortly after the NIRA
was passed, that the NIRA’s wage and price fixing would slow recovery
from the Depression, and he was not alone.187 As a theoretical matter,
Keynes and others were on solid ground. Wage and price floors can
interfere with the ordinary process of macroeconomic adjustment and self184. See SCHERER, supra note 178, at 362 (“Monopolistic pricing may be a cause of
recession if it reinforces tendencies toward the stagnation of demand—e.g., by transferring
too much income into the hands of individuals or groups with high marginal propensities to
save.”).
185. See supra notes 111–24 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
187. See Letter from John Maynard Keynes to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Dec. 30,
1933), in From Keynes to Roosevelt: Our Recovery Plan Assayed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
1933, at XX2 (“[T]oo much emphasis on the remedial value of a higher price-level as an
object in itself may lead to serious misapprehension of the part prices can play in the
technique of recovery. The stimulation of output by increasing aggregate purchasing power
[i.e., aggregate demand] is the right way to get prices up; and not the other way around.”); id.
(“[M]y first reflection—[is] that NRA, which is essentially reform and probably impedes
recovery, has been put across too hastily, in the false guise of being part of the technique of
recovery.”). Keynes was not the only contemporary economist who recognized that the
NIRA’s wage and price fixing provisions would stultify economic recovery. See ECONOMIC
RECONSTRUCTION: REPORT OF THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COMMISSION 17 (1934) (“It is the
rise of prices reflective of increased demand and increased purchasing power which alone
can be associated with the process of recovery. The concomitant illusion that a deliberate
limitation of output, because it raises prices, helps toward recovery is a still more dangerous
fallacy.”); id. at 17–18 (“[A]n all-round application of [NIRA price fixing] would make for
general impoverishment and would solve the problem of ‘poverty in the midst of plenty’ by
removing the plenty.”); Henry Simons, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire: Some
Proposals for a Liberal Economic Policy (Harry D. Gideonse ed., Public Policy Pamphlet
No. 15, 1934), reprinted in ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 40, 53 (1948) (contending
that wage and price inflexibility was “[a] major factor in the cycle phenomenon”); id.
(“Decisively important in the total situation is the exceeding inflexibility of wages—the
explanation of which would require attention to many factors, of which effective labor
organization is but one.”); id. at 75 (condemning the NIRA’s wage and price fixing
provisions); see also Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice
Souter and the Mistranslation of the Due Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 46–49
(1999) (contending that the NIRA and other legislation that increased wages likely slowed
economic recovery).
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correction described above, whereby falling prices increase the real value of
the money supply, stimulate aggregate demand, and return output to the full
employment level given a vertical supply curve. 188 Thus, if the NIRA
codes and other New Deal cartelization policies had merely stabilized prices
(or wages), they would have prevented the process of ordinary
macroeconomic adjustment from occurring. If such cartelization raised
wages and prices as intended, this impact would have exacerbated the
downturn by further reducing aggregate demand and flattening the
aggregate supply curve, thus deepening the Depression. 189
Modern economists have also speculated that the NIRA lengthened and
deepened the Depression, in part because alternative explanations for the
severity of the Depression have proven elusive. 190 Thus, empirical work in
the past two decades has sought to explain why the 1929 downturn proved
deeper and more durable than downturns before or since. 191 Economists
have concluded that the NIRA and NLRA combined to deepen and lengthen
the Great Depression, vindicating the theoretical prediction of Keynes and
his contemporaries. Indeed, President Obama’s first Chair of the Council of
Economic Advisors, Christina Romer, concluded long before her tenure in
Washington that the NIRA, particularly its wage provisions, helped produce
modest wage and price inflation from 1933 through 1937, even though the
Depression’s large reductions in output and employment should have
resulted in wage and price deflation in a well-functioning free economy. 192
This finding confirms the Obama Administration’s speculation that New

188. See SCHERER, supra note 178, at 363 (contending that inflexible monopoly pricing
can prevent price reductions despite a drop in aggregate demand and thus prevent an increase
in real balances that would increase demand); Christina D. Romer, The Nation in
Depression, 7 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1993, at 19, 25 (“In the conventional textbook model a
fall in wages and prices raises real balances, lowers interest rates, and thus stimulates
investment. The rise in investment serves to counteract at least some of the fall in
demand.”); supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. See generally Pigou, supra note 157,
at 343 (elaborating on the claim that a fall in wages and prices will increase real balances and
stimulate aggregate demand, and defending it against Keynesian criticism).
189. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
190. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 104, at 498–99 (contending that the NIRA
and NLRA raised wages and prices between 1933 and 1937 and likely slowed the rise in
national output during this period); Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, The Great Depression
in the United States from a Neoclassical Perspective, 23 Q. REV. (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minn.), Winter 1999, at 2 (reviewing various other possible
explanations for the length and depth of the Depression and concluding that no such
explanation is convincing); id. at 21 (speculating that “[b]y permitting monopoly and raising
wages, the NIRA would be expected to have depressed employment, output, and investment
in the sectors the act covered, including manufacturing”).
191. See generally Cole & Ohanian, supra note 114; Romer, supra note 156; Christina D.
Romer, Why Did Prices Rise in the 1930s?, 59 J. ECON. HIST. 167 (1999) [hereinafter
Romer, Why Did Prices Rise?].
192. See Romer, Why Did Prices Rise?, supra note 191, at 187–93 (testing and
confirming the hypothesis that the NIRA’s wage and price provisions helped bring about
wage and price inflation despite significant output reductions in the early 1930s); id. at 196
(“As a result [of the NIRA and rapid growth in 1933], the huge negative deviations of output
from trend early in the recovery put no countervailing downward pressure on prices.”).
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Deal cartelization reduced the welfare and “purchasing power” of
consumers in cartelized markets.193
Professor Romer’s research also reached the additional conclusion that
NIRA-induced wage and price inflation interfered with the ordinary process
of macroeconomic self-correction, whereby falling prices increase real
income, stimulate aggregate demand, and return output to the full
employment level. 194 As she put it:
The more important effect of the NIRA was to diminish the
responsiveness of price changes to the [negative] deviation of output from
trend. By preventing the large negative deviations of [GDP] from trend in
the mid-1930s from exerting deflationary pressure, it prevented the
economy’s self-correction mechanism from working. Thus, the NIRA
can be best thought of as a force holding back recovery, rather than as one
actively depressing output. 195

This conclusion supplemented Professor Romer’s previous findings that
inflexible wages and prices had resulted in an upward-sloping supply curve
during the early 1930s, thereby accentuating the impact of demand
shocks. 196 Thus, she attributes the ultimate economic recovery to
stimulative monetary policy and a resulting shift in the aggregate demand
curve, and not to any process of self-correction. 197
More recently, other economists have reached similar conclusions about
both the behavior of wages and prices after enactment of the NIRA, as well
as the dampening impact that such increases had on recovery. These
scholars conclude that wages and prices in industries covered by the NIRA
rose significantly between 1933 and 1939, while wages and prices in other
industries remained flat.198 While recognizing that the NIRA ended in mid1935, these scholars conclude that the NLRA provided stronger collective
bargaining rights for employees than the NIRA and that antitrust
enforcement rates were even lower from 1935 through 1939 than during the
1920s, as the Roosevelt Administration declined to prosecute heavy
industries that reached collective bargaining agreements with unions
protected by the NLRA. 199 The resulting cartelization of labor and industry
reduced output and raised wages and prices in the cartelized industries
above the levels found in more competitive sectors. 200 This cartelistic
output reduction reduced employment, causing unemployed labor to flow to
its second best use in more competitive markets, and further depressed

193. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
194. See Romer, supra note 188, at 19, 25.
195. Romer, Why Did Prices Rise?, supra note 191, at 197.
196. See Romer, supra note 188, at 25 (“Between 1929 and 1933, a series of shocks
caused aggregate demand to decline repeatedly in the United States. These declines in
aggregate demand moved the economy down along an upward-sloping aggregate supply
curve. The net result was both progressively worsening unemployment and deflation.”).
197. See Romer, supra note 156, at 757.
198. See Cole & Ohanian, supra note 114, at 787–93.
199. Id. at 785–86.
200. Id. at 787–94.
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wages in those sectors. 201 This wage difference caused unemployed
workers to decline work in the competitive sector and to search for more
remunerative work in the cartelized sector, extending the length of their
unemployment and depressing national output.202 Put another way, many
workers refused to enter the labor force at competitive wages, thereby
creating a positively sloped aggregate supply curve and dampening
output. 203 By supplanting competition in labor and other markets, the
NIRA, NLRA, and related laxity in antitrust enforcement artificially raised
wages and prices, reduced the welfare and purchasing power of consumers
in affected markets, and prevented free markets from reaching equilibrium.
Thus, these policies dampened aggregate demand, constricted aggregate
supply, and slowed the economy’s recovery to full employment. There can
be little doubt that New Deal cartelization deepened and lengthened the
Great Depression.
C. Lessons (Perhaps) for Current Enforcement Policy?
In her speech describing the Obama Administration’s more aggressive
enforcement policy, Ms. Varney did not specify how “inadequate antitrust
oversight” contributed to the Great Recession that formed the backdrop of
her announcement. 204 Nor did she explain how more vigorous enforcement
would have prevented or ameliorated the recent downturn. Still, the lessons
of the NIRA and other forms of New Deal cartelization for antitrust policy
would seem unmistakable: competition, not monopoly or cartelization, will
foster the sort of price reductions necessary to ameliorate and ultimately
correct recessions. 205 By extension, it seems that lax antitrust enforcement
and resulting anticompetitive pricing can reduce aggregate demand and
spark an economic downturn in one of two ways. First, high prices can
reduce the real value of money balances, thereby raising interest rates and
reducing investment. 206 Second, monopoly prices can transfer income from
201. Id. at 805–07.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text (explaining how workers’ resistance
to wage reductions can impact the aggregate supply curve).
204. See Varney, supra note 2, at 4–5.
205. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, PRICES AND QUANTITIES: A MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 342
(1981) (explaining how more stringent antitrust laws and weakened collective bargaining
could enhance price and wage flexibility and thus help prevent shocks to aggregate demand
from reducing output); SCHERER, supra note 178, at 363 (articulating the theoretical
possibility that inflexible monopoly pricing could prevent price reductions despite a drop in
aggregate demand, and thus prevent an increase in real balances that would increase
demand); see also MANKIW, supra note 142, at 266–67 & tbl.9-2 (discussing how various
factors, including the cost of price adjustments, can deter reductions that would otherwise
restore aggregate demand); N. Gregory Mankiw, Small Menu Costs and Large Business
Cycles: A Macroeconomic Model of Monopoly, 100 Q. J. ECON. 529, 536–37 (1985)
(contending that the possession of monopoly power can exacerbate price stickiness and thus
dampen aggregate demand during a downturn); Romer, Why Did Prices Rise?, supra note
191, at 187–93 (finding that the NIRA resulted in wage and price increases during the early
to mid-1930s, despite high unemployment).
206. See supra notes 154–56 and accompanying text (explaining this effect of increased
prices).
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high spending consumers to more frugal producers, reducing consumption
and further reducing demand. 207 Thus, it seems obvious that before or
during a depression or recession, antitrust policy should seek to ban
monopolists’ practices that exclude or hamper rivals, reduce competition,
and raise consumer prices, even if the challenged practice might create
more economic value than it destroys and thus enrich producers more than
it harms consumers. 208 Any resulting static reduction in economic welfare
would be a small price to pay for overall macroeconomic stabilization.
In fact, University of Chicago economist Henry Simons argued as much
in the mid-1930s. Then a lonely proponent of laissez faire, Simons
advocated vigorous government action to break up concentrations of
economic power, including labor unions, to enhance wage and price
flexibility and combat economic downturns.209 In particular, he favored
vigorous enforcement of existing antitrust laws, combined with a new
federal statute chartering all corporations operating in interstate commerce
and preempting contrary state chartering provisions.210 Under this scheme,
the FTC would set maximum limits on the amount of property that any
single corporation could own, setting ownership ceilings low enough to
ensure that markets remained competitive. 211 Moreover, unlike modern
case law under section 2 that recognizes a safe harbor for monopoly
achieved or maintained by means of efficiency, 212 Simons would have
sacrificed efficiency when necessary to maintain competitive markets and
resulting price flexibility. He expressly advocated capping the maximum
size of firms below that necessary to achieve economies of scale when
doing so was “ever necessary to the maintenance of the freedom of
enterprise.” 213 Simons’s specific plan and overall agenda would seem to
bolster the Obama Administration’s assertion that inadequate antitrust
enforcement from 2001 through 2008 helped induce and exacerbate the
recession and that more aggressive enforcement via a consumer welfare
effects standard would hasten macroeconomic recovery.

207. See supra notes 157–58, 184 and accompanying text (outlining such an
“underconsumptionist” view of the origins of the Great Depression); see also SCHERER,
supra note 178, at 362 (“Monopolistic pricing may be a cause of recession if it reinforces
tendencies toward the stagnation of demand—e.g., by transferring too much income into the
hands of individuals or groups with high marginal propensities to save.”).
208. See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text (explaining how practices uniquely
condemned by the consumer welfare effects test invariably enhance economic welfare more
than they reduce it).
209. See Simons, supra note 187, at 56–61.
210. Id. at 58–60.
211. Id.
212. See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text (explaining that section 2 law has
recognized a safe harbor for efficient conduct that created or maintained a monopoly for
decades).
213. Simons, supra note 187, at 60 (insisting that the size of firms should be “even more
narrowly limited” than that required to realize economies of scale).
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IV. MODELING THE IMPACT OF A “CONSUMER WELFARE” STANDARD
ON NATIONAL OUTPUT
This section evaluates the claim that more aggressive section 2
enforcement, pursuant to a consumer welfare effects test, would have
helped stave off the Great Recession or at least hastened recovery. As
recounted earlier, lax enforcement could have contributed to our current
economic woes in one of two ways. 214 First, lax enforcement and resulting
high prices could have reduced aggregate demand and helped cause the
current downturn by reducing the real value of money balances and also by
transferring income from spendthrift consumers to more frugal
producers. 215 Second, like the NIRA and other New Deal pro-cartelization
measures, lax enforcement could have deepened and/or lengthened the
2008–09 downturn, whatever its initial cause, by exacerbating price
inflexibility and preventing the sort of price reductions necessary to restart
demand. 216 This, of course, is how the NIRA (with an assist from the
NLRA on the wage front) apparently helped thwart the economy’s selfcorrection from the 1929 downturn that resulted in 25 percent
unemployment. 217 These two phenomena need not be mutually exclusive.
Lax enforcement could conceivably help induce a downturn and then
prevent or slow recovery. Nevertheless, any claim that more aggressive
section 2 enforcement would prevent recession or hasten recovery does not
withstand scrutiny. If anything, more intrusive enforcement would be
counterproductive.
A. The (Very) Modest Impact of Modern Section 2 Enforcement
Any claim that more aggressive section 2 enforcement could help
stabilize the economy ignores the modest economic impact of such a policy
change. Recall in this connection that the NIRA authorized otherwise
unlawful horizontal arrangements in more than 500 industries, accounting
for roughly 80 percent of private sector non-farm employment. 218 While
the Supreme Court dispatched the codes in Schechter Poultry, the NLRA
authorized the cartelization of labor, and at least 26 percent of American
workers had joined unions by 1940. 219
No one argues that the Bush Administration took its cue from the New
Deal and encouraged cartelization of industry or labor in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. On the contrary, even its detractors concede

214. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 157–58, 184 and accompanying text (collecting authorities
articulating this “underconsumptionist” account of the Depression).
216. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text (collecting authorities explaining
how monopoly pricing can prevent price reductions and resulting self-correction).
217. See supra notes 185–203 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 114–41 and accompanying text.
219. See Cole & Ohanian, supra note 114, at 785 (reporting that union membership rose
from 13 percent of employment in 1935 to 29 percent in 1939); Wachter, supra note 141, at
27 (reporting that 26 percent of the private workforce was unionized in 1940).
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that the Bush DOJ vigorously pursued and prosecuted cartels. 220 Any effort
to connect lax antitrust enforcement with the economic downturn must
focus exclusively on section 2 and demonstrate that more aggressive
antitrust regulation of monopolies would have thwarted or ameliorated the
Great Recession.
Yet there is no reason to believe that private monopoly achieved or
maintained in violation of a consumer welfare effects standard is
sufficiently widespread that more aggressive enforcement can affect the
macroeconomy. Every indication is to the contrary. Indeed, some
monopolies obtain and maintain their dominance via conduct that survives
that more exacting standard. 221 Neither the Obama Administration nor
other proponents of more aggressive enforcement have asserted that
monopolies are ipso facto unlawful. 222 Even the Clinton Administration,
which the Obama Administration praised for its aggressive pursuit of
monopolists, argued that Microsoft had initially obtained its monopoly by
means of conduct beyond the reach of section 2. 223
The records of those administrations that consciously took a more
aggressive section 2 enforcement posture are perhaps the “best evidence” of
the impact of such an approach. Consider President Clinton’s Antitrust
Division, which promised a more aggressive approach than its
predecessors. 224 During Mr. Clinton’s eight years as President, the
Antitrust Division brought at most a dozen monopolization cases. 225 The
case challenging the conduct with by far the largest potential impact on the
macroeconomy was the 1998 suit against Microsoft, whose total revenues,
including those from international operations, accounted for less than 0.2
percent of U.S. GDP that year. 226 Even if these enforcement actions each
220. See AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 7, at 21 (“AAI believes that the [Clinton
and Bush Antitrust] Division deserves outstanding marks for its cartel enforcement activities,
particularly for the surge of enforcement that has occurred since 1995.”); Robert Pitofsky,
Some Predictions About Future Antitrust Enforcement, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 895, 896
(2009) (“Also, as far as the [Bush] Antitrust Division is concerned, any reservations I have
about the level of enforcement do not extend to cartel enforcement, where I believe the DOJ
has been as good or better than almost any administration in my recollection.”); cf. supra
notes 101–03 and accompanying text (recounting lax anti-cartel enforcement during the
Coolidge administration).
221. See AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 7, at 66.
222. Cf. supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing an even more intrusive
standard of no fault liability for monopolists).
223. See Brief for Appellant United States of America at 4, United States v. Microsoft, 56
F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-5037), 1995 WL 17907891 at *4 (detailing the
government’s conclusion that Microsoft had obtained its monopoly lawfully); AAI
TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 7, at 58–59 (praising the Clinton Administration for
bringing “at least seven monopolization cases”).
224. See Stephen Labaton, Rousing Antitrust Law from Its 12-Year Nap, N.Y. TIMES, July
23, 1993, at F8 (predicting more aggressive antitrust enforcement by President Clinton’s
Antitrust Division).
225. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
226. In 1998, Microsoft’s revenue was $14.5 billion. See Microsoft 1998 Annual Report:
Financial Highlights, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/investor/reports/ar98/fins.htm
(last updated May 27, 2010). The U.S. GDP that year was $8.8 trillion in then-current
dollars. See Press Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Annual Input-Output Accounts of the
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resulted in reduced prices in the markets in question, it is hard to believe
that such reductions had any more than a negligible impact on the overall
price level that determines aggregate demand.
The mere fact that the Clinton Administration was more aggressive than
the Bush Administration, however, does not establish that President
Clinton’s Antitrust Division pursued a bona fide consumer welfare effects
test. “More aggressive” does not mean “sufficiently aggressive.” The only
administration we can confidently say pursued the sort of aggressive policy
that the Obama Antitrust Division has outlined is President Obama’s. Yet
in the nearly three years after the withdrawal of the Section 2 Report, the
current administration has charged exactly one firm with a section 2
violation. 227 That firm—a hospital in Wichita Falls, Texas, population
104,000—had 2009 revenues of $265 million, compared to a national GDP
nearly 50,000 times larger. 228 The Great Recession did not begin in
Wichita Falls, and unlawful monopolization of that town’s hospital market
did not weaken the current recovery.
In fact, any impact of the Obama Administration’s invigorated section 2
enforcement pales in comparison to the impact of its encouragement of
outright cartels—labor cartels—under the guise of collective bargaining.229
As explained earlier, economic historians have concluded that union wage
fixing helped slow recovery from the 1930s Depression. 230 Currently,
unions represent about 7 percent of the nation’s private sector workers.231
To be sure, this is a decline from the late 1940s, when organized labor
U.S. Economy, 1998 (Dec. 13, 2001), available at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/
industry/io/2001/pdf/io1201.pdf.
In 1996, the Clinton Antitrust Division also sued General Electric (GE). See United
States v. Gen. Electric Co., No. 96-CV-121, 1999 WL 819637, at *1 (D. Mont. Jan. 11,
1999) (noting complaint filed Aug. 1, 1996). The suit challenged GE’s alleged
monopolization of the market for “servicing of medical imaging equipment.” Id. at *5.
According to GE’s Annual Report to Shareholders, “Technical Products and Services,” of
which Medical Equipment and Service was a subset, provided less than 6 percent of the
company’s $100 billion in revenue in 1998. See GE 2000 Annual Report: Financial Section,
GE, at 44 (Feb. 2, 2001), http://www.ge.com/annual00/financial/images/GEannual00_
financials.pdf (showing $5.323 billion in revenue for that segment). Thus, the government’s
case against GE impacted far less than 0.1 percent of GDP.
227. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 15; Thomas Catan, Obama DOJ
Files Long-Promised Monopolization Case, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 28, 2011, 2:13 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/28/at-last-obama-doj-files-long-promised-monopolizationcase/.
228. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 15 (reporting the defendant’s
annual revenues); Current-Dollar and “Real” GDP, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS,
http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls (last updated Jan. 27, 2012) (reporting currentdollar GDP of $13.9 trillion in 2009).
229. See generally Harold P. Coxson & Christopher R. Coxson, The National Labor
Relations Board in the Obama Administration: What Changes to Expect, U.S. CHAMBER
COMMERCE (Sept. 2009), http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/090915_
nlrb_report.pdf (detailing the Obama NLRB’s various pending initiatives to strengthen the
position of unions at the expense of management).
230. See supra notes 192–203 and accompanying text.
231. See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2010 (Jan. 21,
2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (reporting that 6.9
percent of private sector employees belong to unions).
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represented over 30 percent of the nation’s private sector workforce.232
Nevertheless, the collective impact of union wage-fixing still apparently
dwarfs the collective impact of the monopolistic conduct the Division has
challenged in the past two decades.233 It is therefore hard to describe more
aggressive section 2 enforcement as part of a coherent “national economic
strategy” designed to facilitate economic recovery, as the Obama
Administration claimed. 234
More importantly, the impact of section 2 enforcement is likely
insignificant compared to the ordinary tools of macroeconomic
stabilization—monetary and fiscal policy. Just over a year before the
Antitrust Division saved Wichita Falls from a hospital monopoly, Congress
passed and the President signed a bill approving $787 billion in tax cuts and
spending increases designed to combat the recession. 235 This came just one
year after President Bush approved a $168 billion scheme of tax rebates.236
During the same period, the Federal Reserve purchased more than $1.7
trillion worth of Treasury Bonds and mortgage-backed securities, the first
of two rounds of “quantitative easing” designed to increase the nation’s
money supply and reduce interest rates.237 These textbook responses to the
Great Recession presumably dwarf the impact of more aggressive section 2
enforcement. 238
B. How a Consumer Welfare Effects Test Could Backfire
and Dampen GDP
In any event, there is a more fundamental reason to doubt that adoption
of the novel and more intrusive consumer welfare effects test will enhance
aggregate demand and assist economic recovery. Simply put, the conduct
232. See Wachter, supra note 141, at 27 (reporting that union membership reached 34
percent of the workforce by 1945).
233. Employee compensation accounts for about 64 percent of national income and, thus,
GDP.
See
2011 ECON. REP. PRESIDENT
222
tbl.B-28,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/2011_erp_full.pdf; cf. supra notes
226–28 and accompanying text (identifying only thirteen section 2 enforcement actions
under the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations, none of which impacted more than 0.2
percent of the nation’s GDP).
234. Cf. Varney, supra note 2, at 5 (contending that more vigorous section 2 enforcement
could be part of the “nation’s economic strategy” to respond to the economy’s “extreme
conditions”).
235. See David M. Herszenhorn, Party Lines Barely Shift as Package Is Approved, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A15.
236. See John Sullivan, Tax Rebates in $168 Billion Stimulus Plan Begin Arriving in
Bank Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008, at A10.
237. See Sudeep Reddy, The Fed Decision: How It Works; When It Doesn’t, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 4, 2010, at A15; Quantitative Easing Explained, LIBER8: ECON. INFO. NEWSL. (Fed.
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo.), Apr. 2011, available at
http://liber8.stlouisfed.org/newsletter/2011/201104.pdf (describing the first two rounds of
“quantitative easing”).
238. See supra notes 182, 197 and accompanying text (collecting sources advocating
fiscal and monetary responses to economic downturn); see also Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an
Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 588 (2010) (contending that
antitrust doctrine is suited for addressing market-level failures, but is not an appropriate tool
for macroeconomic stabilization).

1672

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

subject to such a test is far different from the New Deal era cartels that
deepened and lengthened the Depression. Even if the monopolistic conduct
uniquely subject to this more intrusive test has a substantial impact on
aggregate prices and aggregate demand, it is not clear what form such
impact will take. For reasons outlined below, some such conduct may even
reduce aggregate prices. In the long run, application of the consumer
welfare effects test could prevent positive shifts in the aggregate supply
curve and dampen growth in the nation’s potential GDP.
Because any standard of section 2 liability other than per se legality will
ban some price-raising conduct, an evaluation of a more aggressive
standard’s macroeconomic impact must focus on the subset of conduct that
it uniquely captures: conduct causing harm to market consumers that barely
exceeds, equals, or is less than its efficiency benefits. 239 Close analysis
reveals that prohibiting this conduct likely will not enhance aggregate
demand and may even reduce it. To be sure, monopolistic conduct that
survives the Bush Administration’s disproportionality test can, along with
similar conduct by other monopolists, raise aggregate prices and thereby
lower aggregate demand by reducing the real value of money balances and
“transferring” income from consumers to monopolists and their
shareholders. Application of the more intrusive consumer welfare effects
test will ban such conduct simply because it results in prices that are higher
than would otherwise prevail. Under such a standard, the monopolists’
respective markets would be characterized by less exclusion, more
competition, and lower prices.240 Other things being equal, application of
this new, more intrusive test would appear to reduce prices and enhance
aggregate demand.
Other things are emphatically not equal, however, thereby distinguishing
such aggressive enforcement from the anti-cartel enforcement that could
have spurred recovery from the Depression. Unlike cartels or naked
exclusion, which a disproportionality test would also condemn, the conduct
that the consumer welfare effects test uniquely bans would produce
efficiencies that outweigh the allocative harm produced by such conduct.241
Condemning such conduct would reduce producer welfare more than the
resulting increase in consumer welfare, thereby resulting in a net
destruction of economic welfare.242
Recognition that a consumer welfare effects test will invariably reduce
the economic welfare of participants in the relevant market undermines any
claim that the more intrusive test will increase consumption by transferring
income from producers to consumers. Application of the more intrusive
test will increase consumers’ income and thus their consumption
expenditures, but such an increase will come at the expense of a greater—
sometimes much greater—reduction in producers’ income. After all, aside
239. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (describing conduct banned by
competition on the merits, disproportionality, and consumer welfare effects tests).
240. See Varney, supra note 2, at 7–8.
241. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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from the impact of greater output at the margins, any increase in consumer
income will come at the expense of an equal reduction in the income of
producers, who must now charge lower prices.243 Moreover, such
producers will also suffer an additional loss in the form of higher costs that
result from condemnation of efficiency-generating conduct. 244 Taken
together, these two reductions in producer income will exceed any increase
in consumer income resulting from increased output and lower prices.245
Even if producers do, in fact, consume a smaller portion of their income
than consumers, the resulting decrease in their consumption may still more
than offset the increased consumption by consumers. At the very least,
proponents of the novel consumer welfare effects test would find it
difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate that the increased expenditures
by individual consumers would exceed the magnitude of the reduction in
producer expenditures.
Of course, the realization that a consumer welfare effects test reduces the
overall economic welfare of participants in the relevant market does not
rebut the separate claim that this new standard would increase aggregate
demand by reducing the aggregate price level—a construct that does not
incorporate producers’ welfare. 246 The increase in producer welfare,
however, does not exhaust the economic impact of the efficiencies that
characterize this category of conduct. Such efficiencies will have impacts
in other markets as well. By reducing the monopolist’s costs of producing
and/or distributing each unit of (admittedly reduced) output, the challenged
conduct would free up the real resources previously employed to produce
the monopolist’s more costly output for use in other markets.247
Antitrust analysis generally ignores the impact of conduct upon output
and prices in other markets because such analysis rests on the so-called
partial equilibrium trade-off model, which assumes for convenience that a
challenged practice or transaction has no effects beyond the market in
question. 248 By focusing on a single market to the exclusion of others,
economists and others can generate tractable conclusions about the impact
of studied practices on economic welfare, free of the complications that

243. See supra notes 150–58, 162–69 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (explaining that efficiency benefits of
conduct uniquely subject to a consumer welfare effects test will significantly exceed
“deadweight loss” in consumer surplus resulting from resulting market power).
246. See supra notes 76–80, 150–58 and accompanying text.
247. See BORK, supra note 72, at 108 (“Cost reductions [from a merger to monopoly that
creates efficiencies] mean that the saved resources are freed to produce elsewhere in the
economy.”); SCHERER, supra note 178, at 22 (explaining that the cost reduction resulting
from a monopolist’s realization of economies of scale frees up productive resources and thus
increases output in other markets); see also Heyer, supra note 73, at 39–40 (explaining how
merger that reduces production costs frees up resources for use elsewhere in the economy).
248. See Williamson, supra note 74, at 22–23 (graphically illustrating application of the
partial equilibrium model to a merger to monopoly); see also BORK, supra note 72, at 107–15
(reproducing Williamson’s graph and asserting that it can be used to illustrate all antitrust
problems); VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 149, at 126–27 (reproducing the same graph and
agreeing with Bork that the graph can be used to illustrate antitrust problems).
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would arise when conducting a general equilibrium analysis that attempts to
incorporate impacts in other markets.249 This, however, may well be one
more instance in which application of the partial equilibrium model
produces misleading results. 250 The aggregate demand and supply model is
general equilibrium in nature, and any complete analysis of the impact of a
novel enforcement standard on GDP must presumably shed the blinders of
the partial equilibrium framework and attempt to ascertain the overall
impact of that standard, not just the impact in the allegedly monopolized
market. 251
This more discerning analysis paints a quite different picture of the
impact of a novel consumer welfare effects standard on the aggregate price
level, aggregate demand, and GDP. The consumer welfare effects test will
admittedly maximize output (and thus reduce prices) in the particular
markets where such challenged practices take place. 252 To this extent, it
will increase aggregate demand. 253 At the same time, such challenged
conduct produces significant efficiencies. In the partial equilibrium model,
these efficiencies manifest themselves as lower production costs for the
monopolist and enhanced profits for the monopolist’s shareholders.254
Thus, debate about the appropriate welfare standard in antitrust often
focuses on whether this and other improvements in producers’ welfare
should factor into the welfare calculus,255 but this debate diverts attention
from the impact of efficiencies that this model does not capture. Whether
or not the benefits of cost reductions are “passed on” to consumers in the
relevant market, such efficiencies will free up productive resources that will
flow to other sectors in the economy—a fact rarely noted in the antitrust

249. See BORK, supra note 72, at 113–15 (explaining why antitrust analysis should
generally take a partial equilibrium approach); KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 66, at 12 &
n.11 (embracing so-called “Pigouvian assumption” that “we can apply the concept of
efficiency to individual industries and firms,” “even though economy-wide efficiency is
impossible to achieve”); see also VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 149, at 76 (explaining how
partial equilibrium tools focus on impacts in a particular market to avoid second best
problems presented by general equilibrium analysis when some markets are characterized by
monopoly, externalities, and other departures from perfect competition); Arnold C.
Harberger, Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay, 9
J. ECON. LITERATURE 785, 789–91 (1971) (conceding that welfare analyses performed by
economists are usually partial equilibrium in nature, but also arguing that general
equilibrium welfare analyses of such problems are possible).
250. See generally Alan J. Meese, Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution:
Accounting for Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 457 (2011)
(explaining how the application of the partial equilibrium paradigm can produce misleading
results in the Rule of Reason context).
251. See supra notes 148–52 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
255. See generally Heyer, supra note 73 (describing the contending positions in this
debate and arguing for adoption of the “total welfare” approach that maximizes the welfare
of all consumers, and not merely those who happen to purchase the monopolist’s product).
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literature. 256 Because this resource flow will not enhance market power in
other markets, output in those markets will almost invariably increase.257
The partial equilibrium trade-off apparatus allows us to ascertain the
value of this countervailing output increase in other markets. Like all other
firms, monopolists must bid in input markets to purchase productive
resources, competing against firms who could employ the same resources to
produce different goods and services. The resulting price for inputs—the
monopolist’s costs—presumably reflects what competing bidders would
have paid for such resources, that is, the value of the output that such
resources could have produced in other markets. 258 Thus, a challenged
practice that reduces the monopolist’s costs will also free up resources that
presumably increase the value of output in other markets by an amount
equal to the magnitude of the monopolist’s cost reduction.259
Such output increases presumably reduce prices in other markets, thereby
tending to increase the value of real money balances held by consumers in
those markets and bolstering aggregate demand. 260 Indeed, in some cases,
conduct that violates a consumer welfare effects standard might actually
reduce the aggregate price level, by freeing up so many resources that
output increases in other markets collectively lower prices that exceed the
price increase in the monopolized market. 261 This distinguishes such
conduct from the sort of New Deal cartels that produced no offsetting
efficiencies and helped thwart economic recovery and suggests that the
impact of the novel and more intrusive consumer welfare effects test on
aggregate demand would be attenuated at best.262
256. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
257. The only exception will be for those presumably rare cases in which cost reductions
in other markets manifest themselves entirely as reductions in fixed costs. In such cases, the
welfare of producers in those markets will improve without any corresponding output
increase or price reduction in that market. Cf. Heyer, supra note 73, at 36 (“[U]nlike changes
in marginal cost, changes in fixed cost generally do not alter the firm’s profit-maximizing
price, or the level of output at which the firm maximizes its profits, unless they affect the
firm’s very viability.”). Such a reduction in fixed costs, however, may free up resources that
flow to other markets and reduce marginal costs there. Moreover, costs that are fixed in the
short run may well become marginal in the longer run.
258. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 92 (1921); STIGLER, supra note
136, at 112 (“[T]he cost of any productive service in producing A is the maximum amount it
could produce elsewhere. The foregone alternative is the cost.”).
259. See SCHERER, supra note 178, at 22 (explaining that the cost reduction resulting from
a monopolist’s realization of economies of scale frees up resources to produce output in
other markets).
260. Cf. supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
261. In such cases, application of the consumer welfare effects standard would actually
reduce consumer welfare as a whole, even if one excluded producers from the definition of
“consumer” and included only those individuals who purchase products from producers. Put
another way, application of a total welfare standard may in fact improve the welfare of such
narrowly defined consumers more than application of a standard that purportedly seeks to
maximize only their welfare.
262. Monopolized output reduction also frees up resources that can be employed to
increase production in other markets, but such reductions “by definition” allocate resources
to uses that produce less value than they would produce in the monopolized market, with no
offsetting improvement in productive efficiencies. See SCHERER, supra note 178, at 18–19
(“[F]ailure to maximize the value of the output bundle and failure to maximize the sum of
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In fact, the efficiencies produced by such conduct may also impact
aggregate supply and the economy’s potential output. A practice that
reduces the costs of producing any given level of output in the monopolized
market and frees up resources for use in other markets unambiguously
increases the economy’s potential output—the quantity of goods and
services the economy can produce with any given endowment of
resources. 263 To be sure, exercise of monopoly power in one market will
prevent the macroeconomy from reaching its full potential in the short run,
but over the medium and long run, competitors will eventually enter the
market and erode the monopoly. Such entry will increase that market’s
output and move national output closer to its potential. In any case where
the particular market is too difficult for competitors to enter and have an
impact within two years, the DOJ and FTC already step in to challenge the
monopolists’ conduct. 264 Applying a consumer welfare effects test to ban
such conduct entirely will prevent the realization of such aggregate supply
benefits in the first place.
Even if future entry may not erode monopoly power in all markets, thus
preventing the national output from reaching its full potential, national
output may still be higher than it would be under a consumer welfare effects
standard if the value of higher output in other markets outweighs the value
of output lost in the monopolized market. Indeed, it seems likely that the
value of output increases in other markets will predominate for the same
reasons that conduct that the consumer welfare effects test uniquely
condemns will almost always increase total welfare.265 Such conduct will
generally only reduce output “at the margins,” leaving the vast majority of
pre-monopoly output unscathed and limiting the value of output lost.266
Moreover, the price that consumers would have paid for the forgone output
would overstate the resulting reduction in national output because the
resources once used to produce the monopolist’s eliminated output would
flow to inferior—and thus less valuable—uses in other markets. 267 Finally,
the sort of beneficial practices banned by the consumer welfare effects test
will presumably reduce the production costs of all of the monopolist’s
remaining output, which would enhance the magnitude of overall cost

consumers’ plus producers’ surpluses are conceptually identical manifestations of
monopolistic resource misallocation.”). It would be fortuitous, to say the least, if such
output reductions and resulting misallocation of resources reduced the aggregate price level.
263. See supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of potential
output and its relationship to aggregate supply).
264. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES §§ 3.0, 3.2 (rev. ed. 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/hmg.pdf (adopting such a two-year time horizon for evaluating the prospect of
entry in the merger context).
265. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
266. Any conduct that creates greater than marginal output reductions will likely create
very large consumer harm, and therefore would also fail the disproportionality test.
267. See generally SCHERER, supra note 178, at 14–19. That is, the actual harm will equal
the difference between the price consumers would have paid for the foregone output and the
cost of producing it.
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reductions and the size of resulting output increases in other markets.268
These various considerations suggest that this kind of conduct will almost
always increase the economy’s potential output, even if the condemned
monopoly persists for the long run and reduces output in its own market
below the competitive level. Therefore, even if adoption of the consumer
welfare standard could (very modestly) enhance aggregate demand in the
short run by reducing the prevalence of market power, any such benefits
may well come at the high price of dampened growth in potential output
and a smaller GDP in the long run.
Given the various possible impacts of conduct that survives the
disproportionality test, antitrust courts should not attempt to determine the
overall effect of a particular practice on the aggregate price level and
potential output. Those who invoke macroeconomic considerations in
support of a more intrusive standard of liability bear some burden of
proving that the standard will do more good than harm. The conclusions of
this Essay suggest that discharging such a burden would be difficult if not
impossible. Indeed, given the ambiguous impact of such conduct, it seems
likely that fiscal and monetary policy will prove to be far more effective
tools of short-term macroeconomic stabilization than more intrusive section
2 enforcement.
More than four decades ago, Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson rejected
more intrusive antitrust enforcement standards in favor of a total welfare
approach, in part because that approach would enhance potential output and
long-run economic growth. 269 He espoused the following view:
Economic theorizing, research, and policy discussion have tended to be
excessively concerned with “macro-economic” . . . to the neglect of
“micro-economic” problems of efficient resource allocation, whose
solutions are likely over the long run to be more important to the
achievement of a highly productive and rapidly growing economy. In a
fully employed economy, the main concern of economic theory is with
these “micro-economic” problems of allocation of scarce resources
among competing uses. 270

The lesson, according to Williamson, is simple. Antitrust is not a tool of
macroeconomic stabilization. Instead, the Sherman Act should stick to
what it does best—namely, banning any practice that results in a net
reallocation of resources, while leaving unscathed conduct that, despite
increasing consumer prices, creates significant efficiencies, frees up
resources for use in other markets, and increases potential output. Courts
implementing section 2 have embraced this preference for efficiency268. Cf. Fisher & Lande, supra note 85, at 1626 (“[C]ost savings, however, extend to all
products actually manufactured. Since output still produced typically far exceeds the
amount reduced by increased monopoly power, relatively small increases in efficiency can—
and usually will—dominate much larger increases in monopoly power . . . .”); supra notes
258–59 and accompanying text.
269. See Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59
AMER. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 105, 105–06 (1969).
270. See id. at 112 (alterations in original) (quoting Harry G. Johnson, The Economic
Approach to Social Questions, PUB. INT., Summer 1968, at 68, 69).
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creating practices for most of the statute’s 120-year history, apparently with
good reason. 271
CONCLUSION
For decades, courts applying section 2 have recognized a safe harbor for
monopolists’ conduct that creates significant efficiencies, even when such
conduct reduces the welfare of consumers in the relevant market. Both the
disproportionality and consumer welfare effects tests would result in more
intrusive regulation of monopolists’ practices than the standard applied in
the case law. This Essay has evaluated the claim that the Bush
Administration’s disproportionality standard was analogous to the NIRA
and other New Deal cartelization schemes, and thus helped cause and
exacerbate the most recent economic downturn. This Essay also examined
the Obama Administration’s claim that application of the even more
intrusive consumer welfare effects test would have helped prevent, or at
least attenuated, the downturn.
As shown, section 2 enforcement can have only a very modest impact on
the macroeconomy. The Obama Administration itself has only challenged
one monopolist—and a local one at that. Furthermore, conduct that
survives scrutiny under a disproportionality test, but fails the consumer
welfare effects test, bears only passing economic resemblance to the New
Deal cartels. While such conduct, like cartel pricing, reduces output in the
relevant market, raises prices, and thus harms purchasers of the
monopolist’s product, it only survives scrutiny under the disproportionality
test because it creates significant efficiencies. These efficiencies will
almost certainly exceed the magnitude of the deadweight economic loss
resulting from monopolistic output reduction.
Not only do these
efficiencies increase producers’ income—and thus consumption—but they
also free up resources that flow to other markets, increasing output and
reducing prices in those markets. The realization of such efficiencies will
also impact the long-run aggregate supply curve by enhancing society’s
potential output. Thus, it seems improbable that banning conduct uniquely
subject to a consumer welfare effects standard will foster macroeconomic
stability and maximize GDP over the long term. Instead, antitrust law and
policy should focus on identifying and condemning those practices that on
balance result in a misallocation of resources and a reduction in total
economic surplus. Any more intrusive regulation will likely mean less
potential output and less GDP.

271. See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text.

